Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
Moreover, the Luftwaffe and the German Navy had done virtually no
preparatory work to iron out how they would cooperate in protecting convoys
against enemy surface attacks or how they would cooperate in a massive
air-sea battle. It is worth noting that in 1941 in the waters off Crete, the
Luftwaffe found it impossible to protect the German seaborne landings
from the Royal Navy despite total air superiority and perfect weather conditions.%
Thus, the Luftwaffe had little sense of the complex tasks that its
air units would have faced in subduing the Royal Navy while supporting an
in~asion.~’ Interestingly, neither Hitler nor Churchill seemed to have fully
believed that a cross-channel invasion was in the cards. The Prime Minister
in September 1940 sent a sizeable percentage of Britain’s armored strength
to the Middle East-hardly the decision of a man who believed an invasion
was imminent.98 Witler also appears to have been dubious about prospects
for the invasion; from the beginning, the Fuhrer, for the only time in the
war, had little to do with the planning and conduct of operations preparing
the way for SEA LION.
The Luftwaffe faced very different strategic problems in the summer
of 1940 than it had dealt with in its three previous campaigns. Its opponent,
the RAF, possessed relatively secure bases that would not be under ground
attack unless it was first defeated. Consequently, the Luftwaffe ground support
structure could not move forward behind the army’s advance. Only air
attacks could hope to disrupt RAF maintenance and supply. Nevertheless,
with new bases in the Low Countries and northern France, German bombers
could reach most of the important transportation, industrial, and population
centers in Great Britain as well as RAF airfields. And unlike other
air forces in 1940, the Luftwaffe had attempted to solve the long-range
escort problem. Unfortunately for German prospects, the fighter explicitly
designed for that role, the Bf-110, while possessing the range to accompany
deep penetration missions, could not stand up against first-class, single-engine
fighters. Against the Hurricane and Spitfire it lacked both speed
and maneuverability-a deadly combination. Thus, the Bf-109 would have
to protect not only the bombers but Bf-110 formations as well, and the
range of the Bf-109 was such that even with the airfields in Pas de Calais it
could barely reach London.
In a June 1940 memorandum, Jodl sketched out the strategic framework
for victory over Britain.99 For a direct strategy, he saw three approaches:
1) an air and naval offensive against British shipping along with
attacks against industry; 2) terror attacks against major cities; and finally
3) landing operations to occupy an already prostrate England. The Luftwaffe,
Jodl suggested, must gain air sqperiority ; by destroying industrial
plants, it would insure that the RAF could not recover. He also suggested
that air superiority would prevent the RAF from striking the Reich and
particularly the Ruhr. It is within this context that German attacks on
Bomber Command’s airfields must be seen: German air strategy during the
90