Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

WAR AGAINST JAPAN
influenced by reports of ineffectiveness of IJAAF units in coping with the
U.S. Navy carrier raids of February 1945. The general was convinced that,
because of the previous Japanese stress on fighter versus bomber tactics,
interceptor pilots must have been unschooled in methods of identifying and
engaging enemy fighters. In the case of large-scale enemy bombing raids,
Kondd wanted defending fighters to conducted concentrated counterattacks,
without being distracted by enemy scout planes. Kondd also wished
to tighten the protection of parked aircraft, to employ decoy planes that
would lure enemy aircraft within range of ground artillery, to modernize
the defensive system with new radar, and to improve the maintenance and
supply of aircraft and equipment.
Among the practical effects of General Kondo’s directives in the spring
of 1945 were a pronounced intensification of fighter versus fighter training
and the delegation of responsibility to IJAAF group commanders to engage
raiders, on a case-by-case basis, designed to exploit any local advantages.
Surviving officers of the 10th Air Division assert that by terminating the old
system of unit-wide alerts, of aimless patrolling, and of blanket area coverage,
Kondd introduced flexibility of command and operation and reduced
wasted effort on the part of the defenders6’
Of course, the various measures instituted by the Japanese were
intended to enhance the air defense posture, but they came very late in the
war and they did not provide appreciably more punch, quantitatively or
qualitatively. Some GDC officers later admitted that unification of the
Army and Navy air forces would have been the best improvement to make,
by far. But even if there had been a consensus (which did not exist at the
time), it was much too late to have introduced unification. Establishing new
tiers of command and revamping conventional tactics of engagement could
accomplish little unless the interceptor units themselves were reinforced.
Since this was becoming unfeasible, an unrealistic increase in assigned
defensive tasks became the rule.62
Evidence of the relative impotence of the Japanese air defenses
occurred when General LeMay sent 334 B-29s from Guam, Saipan, and
Tinian to bomb Tokyo by night and at low altitude on March 9, 1945.
Taken by surprise by these new tactics, Japanese radar installations failed
to detect aircraft not appearing at the usual high altitudes. As soon as it
learned of the raid in progress, the 10th Air Division sent up 90 fighters,
which were to work with the antiaircraft and searchlight units. By the light
of the enormous fires that illuminated the skies over Tokyo, the interceptors
climbed to engage the B-29s from below, but soon afterward the
rising clouds of smoke obscured the visibility, and further attacks became
impossible. The first U.S. bombers reported encountering “nil” fighter
opposition; later B-29s called it “weak.” Throughout the 3-hour raid,
B-29 crewmen noted only 76 sightings and 40 passes by Japanese fighters,
usually conducted when a bomber was caught in searchlight rays. While
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