Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

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KOREA
overall trend, however, was fewer combat hours and a greater percentage
of that combat time at night.
The night raids were employed to reduce losses. (See Table 9-7) Moreover,
the B-29 loss rates, even in daylight raids, were lower than comparable
rates for the European theater in World War 11. (See Table 9-8)
Unfortunately, FEAF had no large B-29 reserve to call on, and USAF
headquarters was not about to deploy B-36s or, later, B-47 jet bombers to
Japan or Okinawa for use in Korea. It was a difficult situation for FEAF’s
Bomber Command: given obsolete or obsolescent equipment that was
often in short supply, it nevertheless had a crucial assignment, and the
enemy understood the importance of that assignment as clearly as did
Bomber Command.
While the B-29s halted Chinese/North Korean attempts to rebuild
airfields below the Yalu, the F-86 squadrons-always outnumberedcontinued
their daylight campaign against MiGs based in Manchuria. From
the summer of 1951 on, the level of air-to-air combat increased dramatically.
TABLE 9-6
B-29 Night Sorties
1952 1953
Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun
1472 1237 1247 1435 1343 1568
Source: FEAF Korean Air War Summary, June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953.
TABLE 9-7
B-29 Operational Losses
1950 1951 1952 1953
Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul
9 11 14 10 8 4 1
Source: FEAF Korean Air War Summary, June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953.
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