Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

NORTHWEST AFRICA
The Allied Air Force and Axis Counterattacks of Winter
Heavy fighting accompanied arrival of Rommel’s forces in Tunisia,
as well as the reorganization of the Axis defense. Rommel’s famed Afrika
Korps (now styled the First Italian Army) faced Montgomery’s British
Eighth Army, while in the west, Eisenhower’s Allied forces were confronted
by Hans-Jurgen von Arnim’s Fifth Panzer Army. Under a January
reorganization, Axis armed forces now came under overall command of
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. Luftjotte 2 had the continuing task not
only of helping maintain the logistical lifeline between Italy-Sicily and
Tunisia through provision of air cover and transport aircraft, but also
forward-based tactical bombardment and fighter support via Fliegerkorps
Tunis. Seven principal airdromes from Bizerta to Kairouan, six
near Gabes, and others at Mezzouna, Sfax, and La Fauconnerie, served
as forward bases from which the 53d and 77th Fighter Wings, for example,
could operate. Axis losses of 201 aircrews and 340 aircraft (out of a
strength of 877), incurred from stopping the Allied advance toward
Tunis, were more than offset by the Luftwaffe and Italian Air Force’s
ability to draw upon resources in Sardinia, Italy, and Sicily in order to
continue maintenance of local air superiority at crucial points in the
campaign.27
The question of attaining air superiority loomed paramount to both
sides, mainly because it held the key to continued Axis presence in North
Africa. By this period, the Allies had finally begun to muster sufficient
quantities of aircraft and to overcome forward airbase shortages so as to
better contest the air space over the battle area as well as interdict the Axis
logistical lifeline. In a sense, all air activities (whether reconnaissance,
interdiction, strategic bombardment, counterair, or ground support) were
indissolubly linked to the air superiority issue. But air power in itself
remained unquestionably tied to the ground force effort to eradicate the
Axis bridgehead in Tunisia.
In January and February, the Axis forces launched a series of limited
counteroffensives designed to enlarge their constricted bridgehead and disrupt
Allied plans before final arrival of Montgomery’s army from Egypt and
Libya. Near disasters like Kasserine Pass (February 14-23) only confirmed
the immaturity of Free French and American ground units, as well as the
continuing lack of close coordination between air and ground operations.
Virtually daily disagreement between Allied airmen and ground generals
clouded the picture and reflected Tedder’s contention that aircraft in Northwest
Africa, at least, were being “frittered away in penny packets” by
“attacking targets all on the orders of local Army Commanders.”ZX Air Marshal
Sir Arthur Coningham, Commander of the Western Desert Air Force,
echoed such sentiment, suggesting that lack of realistic training and the
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