Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
failure to heed lessons from the Western Desert air war lay at the root of
such
Americans such as Spaatz quite agreed.
Eisenhower and Spaatz had met on January 21 to attempt to bring
about some degree of cooperation and coordination between various Allied
armies and air forces to blunt and then halt the German attack on the
French XIX Corps in central Tunisia. Eisenhower told Spaatz that he had
selected Anderson as his deputy, with command over all Allied ground
forces, and requested that Spaatz establish an army support command
headquarters at Anderson’s headquarters to coordinate the actions of
Allied Air Force with those of the Allied ground forces. Spaatz directed
Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter to establish the Allied Support Command,
consisting of the XI1 Air Support Command and the RAF’s 242 Group, with
the mission of supporting the Allied ground forces.3o Even before the formal
establishment of the Allied Support Command, aircraft of the XI1 Air
Support Command and 242 Group were attacking enemy targets in front of
the British I1 and French XIX Corps.3’
Spaatz, by setting up the Allied Air Support Command under the command
of Kuter, achieved centralized command and control of all Allied
aircraft used to support Allied ground forces in Tunisia. The American general,
however, concluded that the AAF in Tunisia was employing the wrong
tactics to win air superiority while supporting ground forces. Spaatz
thought that attacks should be mounted with the greatest possible force and
constantly changing targets to prevent the enemy from massing against the
Allied Air Force. Another tactic was to attack enemy aircraft on the ground
in an effort to destroy the Axis air forces. Above all, Spaatz thought that it
was a mistake to engage in indecisive operations, contending that the role
of an air force was to hit the enemy’s “soft parts. . . and in return protect
the soft part of one’s own force. . . .”32
During the evening of February 4, Spaatz had a discussion with Maj.
Philip Cochran, the commanding officer of the 58th Fighter Squadr~n.~)
This squadron had been so badly shot up when on ground support operations
that it had to be withdrawn from combat and rebuilt. On the day in
which the 33d Fighter Group (including the 58th Fighter Squadron) had
been forced out of combat, the XI1 Air Support Command lost thirty-six
aircraft while attacking enemy ground forces. A British staff history states
that the Americans suffered heavy casualties because they were attempting
“to maintain continuous air cover [over] the battle areas, and at the same
time provide fighter escort for A-20s and P-39s.” Another reason given in
this staff history is that the Germans in Tunisia had been reinforced by
the remnants of the Luftwaffe that had been driven out of Libya by the
British.34
During breakfast with Spaatz the next morning, Major Cochran delineated
what he thought was wrong with AAF ground support tactics. According
to Cochran, the American losses “in aircraft had been brought
240