Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SOVIET AIR FORCE
airfields were either partially or completely out of use in June 1941. Soviet
fighters were crowded together on those fields possessing operational runways,
thus depriving them of maneuverability, camouflage, or dispersal,
i.e., sitting ducks all in a row awaiting the Luftwaffe.I6
Soviet Prewar Air Doctrine
The leaders of the VVS, like those of many other air forces in the
1930s, were to some degree attracted to the Douhet doctrine on the role of
the strategic bomber-the smashing and terrorizing of the enemy by massive
air attacks on his industry and cities. A. N. Lapchinsky, an outstanding
theorist of the 1930s, although conceding an important place for independent
bomber strikes, nevertheless, held to the Soviet teaching of the “interaction
of all arms,” i.e., not to put all emphasis on the strategic bomber. In
addition, the adventure in Spain led Soviet airmen to downgrade the effectiveness
of high-level strategic bombing, to perceive the dive bomber as
capable of far greater accuracy, and to see the main role of air power as
close-support for the ground forces. For example, the Field Regulations put
out in June 1941 stated that the basic task of aviation was to assist the
ground forces in combat operations and to insure control of the air. VVS
was specifically given the following missions: to attain control of the air, to
assist the ground forces, to provide cover for the troops achieving breakthrough
by striking targets deep in the enemy rear, and to conduct air reconnaissance.
In cooperating with the ground forces, the air forces were
split into Front and Army Aviation, a division that did not work out in
practice since it fragmented the air support and made the concentration of
forces difficult and centralization of control nearly impossible.
In a sense, air supremacy was considered one of the most important
missions of the VVS, as successful close support was dependent upon control
of the air. The Soviets held that attainment of air supremacy would only
be possible through the combined efforts of the air assets of several Fronts
plus the aviation of the High Command and the air defense forces. The
struggle for control of the air would be carried out in two ways: destruction
of the enemy aircraft on the ground and by attrition in air combat. The
experience in Spain, however, led the Soviets to favor air combat as the
best method, a concept that meant giving the main role to fighter aviation.
In the Combat Regulations for Fighter Aviation, 1940, it was clearly stated
that fighter aviation was the chief means in the struggle with the enemy for
control of the air and had as its basic task the destruction of the enemy
aircraft on the ground and in the air.’*
Although the fighters were to be the main element in attaining air
supremacy, medium- and long-range bombers were scheduled to carry out
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