Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
bardment as a part of a general air superiority campaign should occur only
when 1) an opportunity existed to effect quickly the course of the war; 2)
land and naval preparations had opened this opportunity; 3) a stalemate
had occurred; or 4) a decisive effect could be achieved through the destruction
of the enemy’s sources of p0wer.5~
Wever clearly reflected traditional German fears of being surrounded
by continental enemies. Land and sea borders demanded priority defense
by traditional ground and naval forces. Professionals in those services naturally
wished to have aviation employed in a subsidiary role. However,
Wever and other figures of the period, such as Air Secretary Erhard Milch
and Dr. Robert Knauss (sometime Lufthansa and Air Ministry executive as
well as instructor at the German Air War College) proved equally strident
about an independent role for air power. Knauss suggested that the Luftwaffe
offered vast potential for affecting the European military balance,
even more than army divisions or capital ships of the navy. Thus, the same
arguments swirled through German military circles about the role of air
power that attended national defense discussions in other countries. The
fundamental issue always seemed to be the emphasis on strategic or tactical
employment of aviation, and which one offered the best potential for
achieving air superiority. In Germany, as elsewhere, the matter hinged
largely on aircraft production, provision of trained manpower, and the
overall economic strength of the nation.59
In January 1933 when Hitler took power, 3,200 workers could produce
no more than 33 aircraft annually. Only a full-scale government bailout
could rescue the industry and accomplish the aviation programs envisioned
by Goering, Milch, and other Nazi officials. Three years later, this same
industry employed 124,878 people and produced over 5,000 military and
commercial aircraft annually, according to the influential journal The Economisr.
By 1939, production rates approached 500 to 600 aircraft per month,
and 170,000 men worked shifts exceeding 60 hours a week on occasion.
This was unprecedented anywhere in the world at the time, and it may be
fairly stated that Nazi Germany possessed an aviation industry second to
none. Old established firms such as Junkers, Dornier, and Heinkel were
tied to the Nazi cause, and the true miracle of German rearmament could
be found largely in its focus upon the aviation sector. In many eyes, German
aircraft production methods resembled mass production more closely
than those in Great Britain, France, or the United States.60
The German government-industrial team produced a variety of formidable
aircraft by 1939, reflecting the German emphasis on air superiority as
a prelude to other air operations. In a most rapid fashion, German aviation
had moved from the early models of Arado Ar-68 and Heinkel He-51
fighter aircraft, the Heinkel He-70 bomber-reconnaissance craft (originally
designed as a fast passenger and mail transport), the Henschel Hs-123 dive
bomber, close-support aircraft, and the distinctive Junkers Ju-52 transport,
32