Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
The Fourth FI Wing was convinced that MiG pilots were learning by
experience. In a sense, each side developed tactics based on combat with
the other, and both sides improved from December 1950 to July 1951. In
December, for example, MiG pilots lacked flight discipline; they would
break formation when attacked. By July, MiG formation integrity had
improved drastically. In December, the F-86 flights did not have an adequate
approach tactic. They tended to arrive and depart a patrol zone
together, which meant MiGs could wait on the ground and then take off at
the end of the Sabres’ patrol in order to catch them returning home. Staggering
the arrival and departure time of F-86 flights solved that problem. In
the race for tactical supremacy, however, the USAF held the advantage.
MiG pilots continued to overshoot and underestimate slower jets like the
F-80,55 and there were periods when MiG activity was light-despite the
need of the Chinese ground forces for relief from U.N. strike aircraft attack.
Fighter combat was still a matter of element against element, and the
Chinese Air Force did not have the experience necessary to challenge the
4th FI Wing squadrons on equal terms.
Compared with their counterparts in the 4th FI Wing, Navy carrier
fighter pilots were at a distinct disadvantage. Beginning in July 1950, U.S.
carriers on station in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan employed their
F9F-2 Panther jets in air superiority missions against North Korean airfields.
Aircraft from the carrier Valley Forge, for example, reported
destroying thirty-eight aircraft on the ground at North Korean bases during
July.5b In early November, however, F9Fs first encountered MiGs while
attacking Sinuiju, and the Navy fighter pilots discovered their aircraft
could not come close to the MiG in terms of speed, rate of climb, and service
ceiling.” From that time on, Fifth Air Force’s 4th FI Wing carried the
bulk of the anti-MiG effort. Indeed, the Navy had very real doubts about
the ability of its F9F combat air patrols to shield their carriers from MiG
attack. The problem was not simply a function of the F9F’s limited perfor.mance,
however. With sufficient warning, patrolling F9Fs could be vectored
to intercept attacking MiGs. Once in combat, the superior skills of
the Navy pilots would tend to offset the performance limitations of their
aircraft. Unfortunately, Navy Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and surface
ship radars lacked the reach to give the slower F9F the time necessary to
cut off approaching MiGs. The radar-F9F combination simply could not
react fast enough to intercept the high-flying, speedy MiG.5x The Navy’s
concern was that MiGs would decimate the combat air patrol of a carrier
task force and strafe armed and fueled fighters waiting to launch on deck.
The initial MiG assault would then be followed up by bombing attacks
staged by conventional aircraft. This fear was never realized, but the inferior
performance of Navy day fighters kept them on the sidelines of the air
superiority campaign for the rest of the war.
With what limited support the Navy could offer, Fifth Air Force fight-
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