Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
armament. As was the case in Germany, the Japanese did not develop a
4-engine bomber, although Mitsubishi executives urged the Navy to incorporate
that principle into the G4M aircraft. In general, maneuverability and
speed characterized Japanese fighters, while durability attended the various
types of carrier and light bombardment aircraft. If Japanese military
aviation was the best in the Far East at the end of the 1930s, its problem
was the strength of the defense industrial base as part of the quest to maintain
overall air superiority in that region.77
The Japanese tested many of these airplanes against the Chinese and
the Russians between 1937 and 1941. The Japanese flyers enjoyed air superiority
against the Chinese from the beginning. The IJAAF practiced close
air support of ground operations and tactical interdiction strikes, while
both Army and Navy air arms carried out bombing raids against virtually
unprotected Chinese cities. Shanghai and Nanking hardly provided the
type of strategic target envisioned by European theorists such as Douhet.
If the Chinese populace seemed terrorized by the rain of aerial bombardment,
the size and rural character of Chinese society neutralized the political
impact of such tactics. The Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek
did not succumb, although large portions of the country passed under Japanese
control. Such footholds on the mainland led to engagements with the
Russians by 1939, and in particular, to the little-known Nonmonhan incident
where Soviet aviation provided a sterner test for Japanese pilots and
their aircraft. In fact, initial Japanese success in gaining air superiority
gradually evaporated as Soviet Marshal Zhukov introduced veterans from
the Spanish Civil War to train and fight with the inexperienced Russian
aviators initially positioned on the Manchurian front. Neither of the
Japanese air arms learned much about air superiority from the Asian
experience. They basically practiced the type of war that they had been
prepared to fight in the first place. Support of land operations, tactical bombardment,
training of pilots, and testing material were the chief activities.
China for the Japanese, like Spain for the Germans, Italians, and
Russians basically taught air forces the tactical lessons necessary for
waging intensive air-ground campaigns. The Japanese did not confirm
or deny the long-range strategic tenets of Douhet, Trenchard, or Mitchell.
But then, Japan, like the others, simply lacked the technological tools to
wage strategic air war in the 1930s and probably did not sense any great
need to do
What these limited war experiences of the 1930s taught the various
participants was the lesson of superior aircrew training. If the short, intensive
air campaign remained the goal of Japanese air strategists (as it did
their German and Italian counterparts), then provision of top quality pilots
and crews became a prime requisite for success. Both IJAAF and IJNAF
training schools provided 300 hours flying time during training before
assignment to a tactical component. By comparison, American military
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