Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
Chinese and North Koreans to accept the inevitability of an armistice. In
1952-53, Fifth Air Force and FEAF forces had attacked targets in North
Korea of significant strategic value. In 1953, FEAF and Fifth Air Force also
struck at enemy front-line armies (and their support bases, including the
dam and dike system which sustained North Korean rice production)
and enemy airfields. Navy carrier air wings were employed against 9
North Korean air bases, and Navy carriers continued to operate within
range of Manchurian-based MiGs.‘” The goal was to show the Chinese
and North Koreans that further combat would not give them better armistice
terms.
At the same time, FEAF requested-and was granted-nuclear strike
capability to counter a possible expansion of the air war by Chinese
and Soviet forces.Io7 FEAF’s Director of Targets drew up lists of key
Chinese and Russian airfields in case the Peoples’ Republic and the
USSR decided to attempt a coup de main in the Far East.Io8 General
Weyland “had long held the view that an initial atomic strike was of
critical importance,” and he requested, in March 1953, “expansion of
FEAF’s fighter-bomber attack ~apability.”~O~ He already had one squadron
of F-84 fighter-bombers in training for atomic weapons delivery; he
wanted two more. Then he would have a whole wing especially trained
to drop recently developed tactical nuclear weapons-in addition to a
still-classified number of B-29s (presumably the whole FEAF force of
about one hundred) with that capability.lI0 It was clear to the U.N. command
that enemy ground forces were massing for another spring offensive.
It was possible that the Chinese and Russians would escalate the air war
to sustain that offensive.
The severity of the spring 1953 air war is reflected in Table 9-1 1, which
compares the months just before with the months of the U.N. air assault on
enemy air and field armies. Comparing the total number of F-86 sorties
with those from the same period in 1952 (11,749) and1951 (3,683) gives
some idea of the magnitude of the fighting. The increased tempo of
operations was possible only because there were more F-86 aircraft
(see Table 9-10) and because a greater number were kept flying than in
earlier campaigns. The U.N. air effort was staged to demonstrate to
the Chinese that steady escalation would not be an effective strategy and
might even backfire. In May, for example, General Vandenberg advocated
privately that the U.S. put pressure on the Chinese through a naval
blockade and by mining Chinese seaports and bombing Chinese industry.’”
In Korea, Fifth Air Force wanted to show the Chinese that the Sabre wings
could shoot down newly trained Chinese pilots as fast as they could be
taught to fly. In Japan, FEAF prepared for possible nuclear strikes on
Chinese and Soviet targets. In Washington, the JCS felt prepared at last for
a showdown worldwide, if necessary. The direct and indirect messages
concerning U.S. resolve and strength apparently had their effect. When the
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