Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

LUFTWAFFE AGAINST POLAND
method which the lessons of military history seem to recommend, but the Air Staff
are convinced that the former is the correct one.’
Thus, a major theme in interwar thinking was that the traditional strategic
factors would not bind air power. In other words, aircraft had negated the
principles of war.3
While a few airmen like Brig. Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell addressed
the problems of gaining and maintaining air superiority, other prewar theorists
denigrated not only defensive air war but also strikes against enemy
air power. In fact, many airmen regarded such strategies as a waste of
effort. There was, of course, evidence supporting the belief that “the
bomber will always get through”; most notably bombers evolved more
quickly than fighters in the 1930s and consequently, it proved difficult to
envision a successful interception of enemy air fleets. Nonetheless, a minimizing
of the possibility of fighters or bombers attacking enemy air forces
or air bases also reflected ideological beliefs that strategic bombing was the
only proper employment for aircraft. As Sir Hugh Trenchard somewhat
crudely stated while discussing a possible air war with France:
I would like to make this point again. I feel that although there would be an outcry,
the French would probably squeal before we did (in an air war between France and
Great Britain). That was really the first thing. The nation that would stand being
bombed longest would win in the end.4
Luftwaffe Development
The general historical view has tended to place the Luftwaffe outside
the mainstream of the interwar airpower theories. It suggests that the many
German Army officers transferring to the new service in 1933 brought with
them only narrow, land-war oriented concern^.^ Thus, supposedly, the
Luftwaffe became closely tied to the army’s coattail with neither interest in
nor understanding of strategic bombing. Reinforcing this view has been a
historical construct, the so-called “blitzkrieg” strategy, that argues along
the following lines: the Nazi leadership, faced with certain economic and
political preconceptions, evolved a grand strategy suited to Germany’s
peculiar needs. This strategy, the argument continues, did not include
rearmament in depth, but created an elite panzer force, supported by
the Luftwaffe, to fight short, quick campaigns to avoid a long, drawn-out
war.6
Unfortunately, this generally accepted view now appears erroneous.
German grand strategy and its air component did not follow an obvious or
consistent path. Rather there existed at the highest level an almost complete
lack of strategic planning. Admittedly, Hitler possessed a clear sense
of his long-range goals: to destroy the European constellation of power and
to establish in its place a Europe under German control entirely free of
Jews and “Jewish-influences.” While the destruction of the diplomatic bal-
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