Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

CONCLUSION
principle of concentration or mass. Mobility, the capacity to maneuver effectively,
is not just a function of the ability to move aircraft rapidly and
flexibly over great distances. True mobility also involves the capacity to
construct air bases promptly in forward areas. When the Allies invaded
North Africa in 1942, for example, airfields were few and far between and
seldom located where most needed. The engineer units sent to construct
new bases were not only ill-equipped but lacking in sound doctrine. Eventually
they hammered out specifications for minimal bases and constructed
over a hundred. But the impressive achievements of the mature organization
should not obscure the faulty conceptualization of the initial effort by
those bent on attaining air superiority. To operate effectively in a hostile
environment such as the sands of North Africa requires highly imaginative
advance planning, balanced kits of spare parts, a wide range of
ancillary equipment such as generators and fuel trucks, as well as the
essential engineer equipment, all before tactical units could be successfully
deployed.
The principle of mobility applies to retreat as well as advance. When
the French and British squadrons in France retreated before the German
onslaught in the spring of 1940 to less threatened air bases further south,
their unpracticed withdrawals were hasty and disorganized. As a consequence
they were less able to generate sorties even when they had the
planes to do so-clear evidence that sortie rates offer a more useful index
of air superiority than total number of aircraft on hand. Field artillerymen
have long understood that their effectiveness hinged upon an ability to get
into action promptly after displacing, whether advancing or retreating.
French and British airmen, operating from sedentary bases in peacetime,
seem to have forgotten the importance of portability.
Although the principle of unity of command has long been recognized,
historically it has proved difficult to achieve. For example, British and
American tactical units were sent out to North Africa in 1942 before the
details of command had been settled. This virtually insured several months
of confusion and conflict until a unified command structure could be hammered
out. The solution finally agreed upon proved to be workable and
durable. The nation providing the lion’s share of resources gets to appoint
the unified commander, but his principal subordinate must then be
appointed by the other partner. This simple but practical arrangement set a
precedent of great utility for Allied cooperation in other theaters as well as
a guide for the long-range future in the quest for air superiority.
Whatever the doctrinal manuals may say about the necessity for unity
of command (FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, published
in July 1943, was certainly explicit on this point), any commander
engaged in coalition warfare will find unity extraordinarily difficult to
achieve. The compulsions and constraints of national sovereignty are not
lightly put aside. Failure to achieve unity of command, however, exacts a
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