Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
standards at the end of 1943. Remarkably, this expansion of the force was
paralleled by a steady increase in the total number of hours of training
given to each pilot. Between late 1942 and mid-1943, the average AAF
pilot received somewhat less training than his ally in the RAF and more
than his enemy in the Luftwaffe. After July 1943 the AAF average drew
level with the RAF and then pulled slightly ahead in 1944. By mid-1944
future Allied pilots were receiving between 320 and 400 flying hours of
training, as compared with just over 100 for Luftwaffe cadets.18 The
Luftwaffe was caught in an increasingly vicious circle. As its less qualified
pilots entered the force, they were killed or injured at increasing rates
because they had to fight fresh pilots who were better trained as well as the
veterans whose experience made them more lethal adversaries with each
passing day.
There were also major differences in force structure between the Luftwaffe
and the Allied air forces. The Luftwaffe began the war with a balanced
force containing fighters, dive bombers, medium bombers, and
reconnaissance and transport aircraft. By mid- 1943 the medium bomber
force had suffered a severe decline in numbers and adequately trained aircrew,
a fact that greatly reduced the offensive weapons available to the
Luftwaffe in any struggle for air superiority. The Germans did not possess
a long-range heavy bomber force at the start of the war, nor did they succeed
in developing a reliable machine of this type in any quantity during
the conflict. Many German airmen recognized the offensive potential represented
by the strategic bomber. Yet the combination of raw material and
petroleum constraints, design problems, and the clear need to develop first
those forces capable of directly supporting the large land operations that
would begin immediately in any war in which Germany became involved
prevented the development of such a force before the war.I9 Some effort
was invested in a strategic bomber project during the war, but poor organization
and leadership, the old resource problems, and a bad aircraft design
produced only small numbers of a very unreliable machine (the He-177).20
By mid-1943, the Luftwaffe was an air force suffering from a steady deterioration
in its effective offensive power. In contrast, the large and growing
force of American and British long-range bombers allowed the Allies to
attempt to gain a general air superiority by attacking the production of aircraft,
key supplies like aviation gasoline, and the operational infrastructure
in the Reich. In addition, the very large Allied force of medium bombers
and fighter-bombers also gave the Allies the clear offensive edge in any
contest for local air superiority.
Both sides possessed modern high-performance fighter aircraft. The
best evidence seems to indicate that, with the exception of the American
long-range fighters, neither side enjoyed any major performance advantages
in this type of aircraft. As the Military Analysis Division of the
United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) noted:
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