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Thinking and Deciding

Thinking and Deciding

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SELF-CONTROL 489<br />

Why we need self-control<br />

It is clear from the examples just given that we take active steps to control ourselves.<br />

In a way, the idea of self-control is a paradox. We either want the fourth bottle of<br />

beer, or we do not. What could it possibly mean to want it but keep ourselves from<br />

having it because four would be too much? If we keep from having it, isn’t that<br />

because we do not really want it?<br />

A familiar way of looking at this is to say that there are actually two people<br />

within each of us, locked in a perpetual struggle for control of our behavior: the id<br />

<strong>and</strong> the superego, the child <strong>and</strong> the parent, the foolish <strong>and</strong> the wise. Self-control<br />

occurs when the superego (parent, wise) wins. Indulgence occurs when it loses.<br />

Whatever sense such an idea may make, we do not need it to explain the phenomenon<br />

of self-control. Ainslie (1975, 1992) has proposed an account of selfcontrol<br />

based on the kind of dynamic inconsistency shown in Figure 19.2. The first<br />

reward, T1 represents the temptation, such as having the fourth beer of the evening;<br />

the second, fT2 represents some greater reward that would be received farther in<br />

the future, such as not having a hangover the next morning. Now if you make the<br />

choice at breakfast that morning (to the far left of the graph), notice that the utility<br />

of the second, greater reward (not having a hangover) is higher. As you approach<br />

the time at which the first reward (drunkenness) is available (the evening), however,<br />

its temptation increases, enough so that its utility surpasses that of the later reward.<br />

Therefore, if you make your choice in the morning, well before the temptation, you<br />

will choose (relative) sobriety, but if you make it when the temptation is at h<strong>and</strong>, you<br />

will (very likely) give in. Put another way, instead of two people, we can think of<br />

one person’s preferences at different times. In the morning, the person will decide<br />

against the beer; in the evening, the person will decide in favor. Knowing about the<br />

conflict, the “morning person” will try to bind the “evening person.” Of course, they<br />

are the same person, so what is really happening is that people try to bind themselves,<br />

to control their own future behavior. The paradigm case is Ulysses.<br />

Methods of self-control<br />

Ainslie (1982, 1992) suggests four general ways in which we solve the problem of<br />

binding ourselves.<br />

Extrapsychic devices. One way is to remove the choice. We can throw away<br />

the bottle of scotch, or throw away the ice cream we are trying to avoid (so that<br />

when we want it late at night, it will not be there, <strong>and</strong> it will be too late to buy any).<br />

Christmas Clubs fall into this category. This <strong>and</strong> other mechanisms of forced saving<br />

help people avoid the temptation to spend money. Even some pigeons learn to peck<br />

a key to remove temptation: Given a choice between a small immediate reward <strong>and</strong><br />

a large delayed reward, they choose the former, but if they are given a key that would<br />

simply eliminate the tempting smaller reward (earlier, before the choice was made),<br />

they often peck it (Ainslie, 1975, pp. 472–473).

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