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Thinking and Deciding

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176 HYPOTHESIS TESTING<br />

Both of these tests are equally informative <strong>and</strong> equally valuable (Baron, 1985a,<br />

p. 143). If we keep the honey <strong>and</strong> change everything else, the cake will most likely<br />

turn out as it did the first time (whatever way that was), if our hypothesis is true, <strong>and</strong><br />

the cake will turn out differently if our hypothesis is false. If we change only the<br />

honey, the cake will turn out differently if our hypothesis is true, <strong>and</strong> the cake will<br />

turn out as it did the first time if our hypothesis is false. The situations are completely<br />

the same except for the reversal of “as it did before” <strong>and</strong> “differently.”<br />

The reason the subjects choose different tests in the two cases is that they quite<br />

legitimately are pursuing two goals: information <strong>and</strong> a good cake at the end of their<br />

experiment. The effect of their desire for a good cake on their choice of how they<br />

will test their hypothesis is harmless, in this case; either choice is a good one. In<br />

other situations, the conflict of goals may not be so harmless. This is particularly<br />

true when there is no real value in a “positive” result. For example, in the 2 4 6<br />

task, the desire to obtain yes answers may inhibit subjects from thinking of tests that<br />

would yield no as the answer if their favored hypothesis is true, which would in this<br />

case be more informative. Subjects may like to hear the word “yes,” <strong>and</strong> physicians<br />

may like to hear that a test result was “positive,” but these words have no value in<br />

themselves. If we seek to hear them at the expense of obtaining real information, we<br />

are very likely subverting the achievement of our goals.<br />

Schwartz (1982) demonstrated the detrimental effects of seeking reward by asking<br />

one group of subjects to try to earn rewards (nickels) by pressing two buttons<br />

(L <strong>and</strong> R, forLeft <strong>and</strong> Right) in a certain pattern. Pressing the button moved a light<br />

through a five-by-five matrix of squares, starting in the upper left-h<strong>and</strong> corner; pressing<br />

L moved the light down one square, <strong>and</strong> presGsing R moved it one square to<br />

the right. A second group of subjects was asked to discover the rule that leads to<br />

reward (although they were not given monetary rewards for correct sequences of<br />

button presses). The rule itself was based simply on the relative number of Ls <strong>and</strong><br />

Rs; any sequence of four Ls <strong>and</strong> four Rs could produce it (probabilistically). Such a<br />

sequence moved the light from upper left to lower right without running off the edge.<br />

Subjects in the reward group usually developed “stereotyped” sequences, such<br />

as LLLLRRRR. At the end of the experiment, when they were asked to give the<br />

rule, these subjects stated exactly the pattern they had been using, <strong>and</strong> they often<br />

felt that this pattern was necessary, the only one that would work. The discovery<br />

group usually did discover the rule. When the reward group took part in a second<br />

experiment with the same instructions as the discovery group, they were less likely to<br />

discover the rule than was the discovery group. Apparently their ability to discover<br />

the rule was inhibited by their tendency to work for reward rather than information.<br />

The reduction of the motivation to discover rules seems to have carried over to a new<br />

task.<br />

In a later experiment, Schwartz (1988) examined the finding that stereotypy led<br />

to the confusion of sufficiency with necessity. After pretraining in either the “reward”<br />

or “rule” condition, subjects were asked to solve problems analogous to the four-card<br />

problem discussed in Chapter 4 but using the same apparatus that Schwartz had used<br />

earlier (the matrix <strong>and</strong> buttons). Subjects were asked to test rules concerning either

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