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Thinking and Deciding

Thinking and Deciding

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WHY EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY IS NORMATIVE 249<br />

Many writers regard the last paragraph as the most important point. They think<br />

of utility theory as a set of conditions for constructing a utility function. A utility<br />

function is an assignment of numbers to outcomes; each number is the utility of its<br />

respective outcome. If the conditions are met for a set of choices, then the numbers<br />

can be assigned, <strong>and</strong> utility is this assignment. By this view, utility is something<br />

we infer from choices. (The choices may be real or hypothetical.) I have taken a<br />

somewhat different view. My view has been that utility is, in a sense, already there.<br />

It is the amount of good that the outcome does, according to all the relevant goals.<br />

By this view, utility theory is a way of inferring choices from utilities (<strong>and</strong> from<br />

probabilities). My view leaves us with the problem of how to discover the utilities.<br />

But we have that problem anyway, because, in fact, people do not follow the theory.<br />

So we cannot use people’s choices to discover their utilities. The next chapter will<br />

explain why people do not follow expected-utility theory, <strong>and</strong> Chapter 13 will explain<br />

how we might measure utility anyway.<br />

Note that following expected-utility theory means following probability theory<br />

as well. The probabilities we assign to the states must be additive <strong>and</strong> must add<br />

up to one (because the states are assumed to be mutually exclusive <strong>and</strong> exhaustive).<br />

The arguments for expected-utility theory therefore provide additional support for<br />

probability as a normative model of belief, as I discussed in Chapter 5.<br />

An alternative principle: Tradeoff consistency<br />

We can replace the sure-thing principle with another principle, which implies the<br />

expected-utility formula with no other principles except weak ordering, tradeoff consistency<br />

(Köbberling <strong>and</strong> Wakker, 2003; Wakker, 1989). A slightly simplified version<br />

of the idea concerns two states of the world, A <strong>and</strong> B <strong>and</strong> two options at a<br />

time, such as the following four choices, in which the numbers represent amounts of<br />

money.<br />

State<br />

Option A B<br />

U 200 100<br />

V 310 0<br />

State<br />

Option A B<br />

W 400 100<br />

X 540 0<br />

State<br />

Option A B<br />

U ′ 200 205<br />

V ′ 310 100<br />

State<br />

Option A B<br />

W ′ 400 205<br />

X ′ 540 100<br />

Suppose you are indifferent between U <strong>and</strong> V , <strong>and</strong> you are indifferent between<br />

W <strong>and</strong> X. And suppose you make your decisions in terms of goal achievement.<br />

Indifference between U <strong>and</strong> V (upper left table) implies that the difference between

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