Thinking and Deciding

BIASES IN MORAL JUDGMENT? 413
Second, intuitions that oppose producing the best overall consequences might
actually lead to worse consequences (Baron, 1994, 1998). Those people who are
concerned with why the outcomes of human decisions are not as good as possible
might find it useful to know that some of the explanation lies in our moral intuitions.
Utilitarians will ask why anyone should suffer harm or forgo benefit because
of someone else’s moral intuitions. Perhaps others can provide an answer, in which
case utilitarianism will not turn out to be the ultimate normative theory.
Can intuitions be values?
Sometimes people say that an intuition is itself a value or goal, so these biases are
not really biases at all, even in utilitarian terms, because such values count as part
of people’s utility. For example, people say that they personally find it worse to
harm others through an act than through an omission. They say that this is one of
their values. So, when we carry out a utilitarian calculation of costs and benefits, we
must count the individual’s disutility arising from performing the harmful act. The
problem is how we distinguish a value from a deontological moral intuition. Such a
moral intuition is a kind of opinion about what should be done, not a judgment about
the consequences.
This issue has many manifestations. One is the question of whether we should
count the anti-Semite’s attitude toward Jews as a value, or the racist’s attitude toward
blacks. It may seem that the values of those who will not inflict harm to prevent
greater harm are quite different from these. From the inside, though, the values
of the racist may feel much the same. Racists may think of their values as moral
ones, even though those who bear the brunt of these values, and most other people,
certainly do not seem them as moral.
A more acceptable example is the intuitions that people have about allocation
of resources. Suppose that a government health program has decided not to pay for
bone-marrow transplants for certain types of cancer, because the transplants are expensive
and very rarely effective. Paying for such transplants would require denying
other people services that are more effective, even at preventing death. An analysis
of utilities supports this decision. But public attitudes go against this analysis and
want the transplants paid for, even at the expense of more beneficial services to others.
If the government decides to give in to these attitudes (because, for example, it
sees itself as democratic), then some people will get marrow transplants and others
will be hurt, perhaps even die, as a result of the denial of other services. In this case,
a moral opinion or value has caused harm to some people and benefit to others, but
the benefit is, we have assumed, less than the harm. We cannot justify the harm by
pointing to greater benefits. The harm results from people’s values or intuitions.
What about moralistic values (p. 396)? Some people are offended by nudity (for
example, at private beaches), homosexuality, or women in public with bare faces or
legs. They want the government to ban these things. Again, they have a value that
seems moral to them but actually goes against the values of others. Should we count
these moralistic values as something worth considering in a utilitarian calculation?