Thinking and Deciding

UTILITARIANISM AS A NORMATIVE MODEL 399
theory itself does. Many writers speak of utility as the satisfaction of preferences.
The term “preference” suggests a decision, however, and we have found that our
decisions are not always the ones that best achieve our goals. It does not do people
any good to give them something they “prefer” now but that will in the future prevent
them from achieving their goals. Our personal goals, together with our beliefs about
the effects of our choices, are the reasons for our preferences, as expressed in our
decisions. Other writers speak of utility as the satisfaction of desires. The term
“satisfaction,” however, suggests an emotion that we experience only after our goal
is achieved, and, as I pointed out in Chapter 10, for many of our important goals we
cannot have this experience (for example, our goal that our children have a long and
happy life after we die). I shall therefore continue to assume that our main concern
is with the achievement of our personal goals.
Some forms of utilitarianism consider effects of choices on the satisfaction of
rational preferences only, those preferences that people would have on reflection.
But the form of reflection is not usually specified. An implication of the view I
present here is that the relevant sort of reflection is about the distinction between
fundamental values and means values (p. 342). We should try to achieve means
values only to the extent to which they are connected to fundamental values by true
belief. We would endorse this principle because it is our fundamental values that
matter, by definition.
Does utilitarianism require calculation?
When we use utilitarian concepts in our everyday reasoning, however, we do not
need to be so precise in our expression. We often speak of “paying attention to other
people’s feelings” when we are trying to emphasize the basic message of utilitarianism,
that what matters in our decision making is the consequences of what we do for
people (not just the people near to us but those distant in time and space as well).
Because of its resemblance to the biblical rule “And as ye would that men should
do unto you, do ye also to them likewise” (Luke 6:31, also Matthew 7:12), Hare
(1963, chs. 6 and 7) calls this sort of thinking a “Golden Rule argument.”
Interpersonal comparison
Utilitarianism requires comparison of one person’s utilities with another person’s.
Does this make sense?
For example, suppose you are in charge of a college residence and you must decide
when to allow John to play his stereo in the residence (and at what volume) and
when he should not. To do this, you would put yourself in the position of John (who
wants to hear his records) and also of the person he might be bothering (Judy, who
lives in the room below). You would ask whose good (utility) is greater: John’s, to
hear his music, or Judy’s, to get her work done. Because moral judgments are impersonal,
it does not matter what particular individuals are involved; the answer should
be the same even if John and Judy switched places. (When they switch places, they