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Thinking and Deciding

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CLASSIFICATION 383<br />

more eggs. ‘How many of these schools are approved for veterans benefits?’<br />

The announcer continues until only the walnut remains. The<br />

announcer cracks the nutshell, which reveals the name of the company,<br />

<strong>and</strong> concludes: ‘This is all you need to know in a nutshell.’ (Tversky,<br />

1972, p. 287)<br />

Other simple heuristics<br />

A great many other heuristics have been proposed, <strong>and</strong> sometimes people have been<br />

shown to use them. One simple example is the recognition heuristic (Goldstein <strong>and</strong><br />

Gigerenzer, 2002), which is to decide on the basis of sheer recognition. If you are<br />

asked which of two cities is larger, <strong>and</strong> you have heard of one but not the other, you<br />

do well to pick the former.<br />

Classification<br />

Suppose we change the task slightly. Instead of looking at a policy already formed<br />

over years of experience (as our personal method of assessing personality is), we<br />

require the subject to learn to make judgments during the experiment. On each trial,<br />

subjects make a prediction <strong>and</strong> are then given feedback about the actual value of<br />

the criterion they were trying to predict. The cue <strong>and</strong> criterion variables can now<br />

be entirely artificial, with labels such as x <strong>and</strong> y instead of GPA <strong>and</strong> SAT. When<br />

this procedure is used, subjects still make their judgments in terms of linear rules<br />

(Klayman, 1984). In general, if the system in question obeys linear rules, subjects<br />

will learn them about as well (or as badly) as they do in real life.<br />

Suppose we make one more change. Instead of the variables being continuous<br />

quantities, with each variable taking several possible values, we use variables with<br />

only two possible values each. For example, let us assume that from such variables<br />

as a person’s hair color (light or dark), shirt color (light or dark), hair length (short<br />

or long), <strong>and</strong> smile (open or closed) we are supposed to guess whether the person’s<br />

name is Asch or not (Medin, Dewey, <strong>and</strong> Murphy, 1983). (Clearly, this is a very<br />

artificial task.) Once again, the results do not seem to change much (Smith <strong>and</strong><br />

Medin, 1981). Subjects’ judgments can be predicted fairly well on the basis of a<br />

linear combination of features.<br />

In this kind of task, though, certain results suggest that something else is going<br />

on. These results may have implications for judgment research as a whole. The fictional<br />

findings from a medical case study given in Table 15.3 were used in an experiment<br />

by Medin, Altom, Edelson, <strong>and</strong> Freko (1982, p. 39). Subjects were presented<br />

with these cases as examples, one by one, <strong>and</strong> were told that the initials represented<br />

patients with “burlosis,” a fictitious disease. In Table 15.3, 1 represents the presence<br />

of a symptom, <strong>and</strong> 0 represents its absence. Notice that the last two symptoms, discolored<br />

gums <strong>and</strong> nose bleed, are perfectly correlated. Otherwise, all symptoms are<br />

equally useful. The same number of patients has each of the four symptoms.

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