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Thinking and Deciding

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THE AMBIGUITY EFFECT 281<br />

Table 11.7: Demonstration of the effect of ambiguity. (The relative number of black<br />

<strong>and</strong> yellow balls is unknown.)<br />

The ambiguity effect<br />

30 balls 60 balls<br />

red black yellow<br />

Option X $100 $0 $0<br />

Option Y $0 $100 $0<br />

Option V $100 $0 $100<br />

Option W $0 $100 $100<br />

Another phenomenon was discovered by Daniel Ellsberg (of “Pentagon Papers”<br />

fame) in 1961. Ellsberg found that subjects violate the axioms of expected-utility<br />

theory by seeking to avoid risks associated with situations in which the probability<br />

appears to be “unknown.” Suppose an urn contains ninety balls. Thirty of them are<br />

red, <strong>and</strong> sixty of them are either black or yellow — we do not know how many of<br />

each. A ball is to be drawn from the urn, <strong>and</strong> we can win some money, depending on<br />

which ball is drawn <strong>and</strong> which option we take.<br />

Ambiguity <strong>and</strong> “unknown probability”<br />

Consider first a choice between options X <strong>and</strong> Y, whose payoffs are shown in the<br />

top half of Table 11.7. You get the choice once. It is not repeated. Most subjects<br />

lean strongly toward option X. They “know” that they have a 1/3 chance of winning<br />

$100 in this case (30 out of 90 balls). They do not like option Y because they feel that<br />

they do not even know what the “real probability” of winning is. It appears to them<br />

that it could be as high as 2/3 or as low as 0. Note, however, that if the principle of<br />

insufficient reason (p. 110) is adopted, we can assume that the probability of winning<br />

is 1/3, given either option, <strong>and</strong> we conclude that we ought to be indifferent between<br />

the two options.<br />

Now consider options V <strong>and</strong> W, whose outcomes are shown in the bottom half of<br />

Table 11.7. Here, most subjects strongly prefer option W, because they “know” that<br />

their chance of winning is 2/3, whereas their chance of winning with option V could<br />

be as low as 1/3 or as high as 1. (Again, the principle of insufficient reason would<br />

dictate indifference.)<br />

Together, this pattern of choices violates the sure-thing principle. Subjects reversed<br />

their choices merely because the “yellow” column was changed. By the surething<br />

principle, this column should be ignored when choosing between X <strong>and</strong> Y, or<br />

when choosing between V <strong>and</strong> W, because it is identical for the two options in each<br />

pair.

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