Thinking and Deciding

392 MORAL JUDGMENT AND CHOICE
Relativism
Moral statements are more than just imperative in this way. As Hare (1963) points
out, the difference between the moral statement, “Tell the truth!” and the ordinary
imperative statement “Open the door!” is that the former is impersonal: That is, it
is meant to apply to anyone who is in certain circumstances. 2 An impersonal rule
need not be very general, for the “circumstances” may be very precisely defined, as,
for example, in this moral statement: “Residents should turn off their record players
on weekdays during exam period, when people nearby are trying to study and are
disturbed by the music.” Although precisely these circumstances do not arise very
often (considering humanity as a whole), this moral prescription applies to anyone
in these circumstances.
The requirement of impersonality comes from one of the reasons we want moral
rules in the first place. We want them to regulate conduct concerning issues that
concern us all. A moral rule or judgment is a type of premise to which anyone can
appeal. Moral advice giving goes beyond specific cases. When we try to influence
people morally, we try to influence some standard they hold for how they should
behave in a class of cases. We thus try to influence the principles they follow, not
just their behavior in a specific situation. And not just one person.
Failure to acknowledge that moral rules are impersonal amounts to relativism.
To the relativist, moral questions are simply questions of taste. What is right (or
wrong) for one person, the relativist says, may not be right (or wrong) for another
person in exactly the same situation. It depends on the person’s own moral beliefs.
I may think smoking marijuana is wrong, but if you think smoking it is moral, then
it is not wrong for you to smoke marijuana. By this view, we can “agree to differ”
about morality, just as we agree to differ about whether we like the taste of okra. If
moral judgments are impersonal, however, such relativistic judgments are not true
moral judgments at all, for it is in the very nature of moral judgments that they apply
to everyone in the circumstances specified by the rule. If you truly think that your
morality is just an expression of your taste, then you have no truly moral opinions.
Impersonality does not require that we agree on moral questions. People obviously
disagree about issues such as premarital sex, euthanasia, or world government.
But the reason our moral disagreements are so vehement is precisely because moral
rules are supposed to apply to everyone. Each side believes that its opinion is an
impersonal rule, which applies to everyone.
If moral judgments are not matters of taste, then some answers to moral questions
(like some answers to virtually any question) are better than others. People often
reject this idea, claiming that “we all have a right to our own opinions” about moral
matters. Notice, though, that the question of whether people have a right to their
opinions is different from the question of whether some opinions are better than
others. We can believe that our opinions are best and still believe that it is morally
wrong to try to force people to agree with us (for example, by prohibiting publication
2 Hare (1963) uses the term “universal” instead of “impersonal,” but “universal” invites misunderstanding,
so I avoid it.