Thinking and Deciding

MORALITY AND PRUDENCE 495
Morality and prudence
Parfit (1984) makes an interesting argument concerning the relation between concern
about our future and concern about others. Does it make sense, Parfit asks, to care
about your own future — the future “you” who is a different person from the present
“you” — but not about someone else’s present? Is there a relevant difference? In
either case, our concern goes beyond our own immediate welfare. Let us look at an
example.
Consider three people: Jill-1, Jill-2, and Jack. Now it just so happens that Jill-2
is Jill-1 as she will be in the future, say ten years from now. Why should Jill-1 care
more about Jill-2 than about Bill? Is it because Jill-2 will share memories with Jill-
1? Probably not. Imagine that Jill-2 is amnesic (forgot her past), or that Jill-1 could
transfer all of her memories to Bill. Would this change Jill-1’s reasons for caring
about Jill-2?
What about the fact that Jill-1 makes plans for Jill-2? Would this justify her
caring about Jill-2? Again, this does not seem relevant. Jill-2 could change the plans
that Jill-1 makes, or Jill-1 might neglect to make any, and it would not seem to matter.
In fact, Parfit argues, it is difficult to think of any reason why anyone ought to care
about herself in the distant future that does not also apply to caring about someone
else in the present (or future), at least to some degree.
The question “Why be moral?” occurs to many people, but the question “Why
care about one’s own future?” occurs to few. By showing the similarity of these
questions, Parfit suggests that it may not be any more difficult to care about other
people than it is to care about our future selves.
The virtues connected with caring about one’s own future are often called prudence,
and prudential judgments are those concerned with one’s long-term interest
(just as certain moral judgments are those involving the interests of others). Both
prudence and morality require that we put aside immediate temptation for the sake
of some distant good — our own future, or the interests of others. Therefore, selfcontrol
is a virtue required for both morality and prudence.
Moreover, prudent behavior and moral behavior usually reinforce one another
(as most of our parents told us). If we are good to other people, if we respect their
concerns and interests, if we keep our commitments to them, then we, in turn, will
benefit in the future, for others will be obliged (usually) to treat us the same way.
Similarly, concern for one’s own long-term future is likely to motivate certain behavior
that turns out to benefit others. For example, the hard work required to become a
physician pays off not only in terms of the respect and tangible rewards that physicians
earn but also in terms of the good works that physicians accomplish on behalf
of others: curing their illnesses.