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Thinking and Deciding

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140 DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF PROBABILITY JUDGMENT<br />

Figure 6.2: Typical pattern of results for a subject’s judgment being correct as a<br />

function of the subject’s confidence that the judgment is correct.<br />

nize correct spellings rather than to produce them (Adams <strong>and</strong> Adams, 1960). In<br />

other cases, though, overconfidence at the right side of the graph (high-confidence)<br />

is extreme. In one cross-cultural study, subjects answered a general-knowledge questionnaire<br />

with items such as “When did the People’s Republic of China join the U.N.:<br />

1971 or 1972?” or “What is the capital of New Zeal<strong>and</strong>: Auckl<strong>and</strong> or Wellington?”<br />

Subjects also indicated their confidence as a probability. All of the items had two<br />

choices for answers, so subjects could score 50% correct by guessing; a confidence<br />

level lower than 50% was therefore never warranted. College students from Hong<br />

Kong <strong>and</strong> Malaysia were correct only about 65% of the time when they said that<br />

they were 100% certain of being correct. (The probability judgments of Indonesian<br />

students were even more poorly calibrated.) British students’ answers were considerably<br />

better calibrated; they scored about 78% correct when they said that they were<br />

100% certain. These differences are not the result of differences in knowledge about<br />

the questions: Rather, the British subjects were more cautious, using the 100% category<br />

far less often, so that they were more likely to be correct when they did use it.<br />

The researchers suggested that cultural differences affect the way that people think<br />

about probability (Wright, Phillips, Whalley, Choo, Ng, Tan, <strong>and</strong> Wisudha, 1978;<br />

see also Wright <strong>and</strong> Phillips, 1980).<br />

Fischhoff, Slovic, <strong>and</strong> Lichtenstein (1977) examined a number of possible explanations<br />

of the basic finding of overconfidence for high-confidence judgments. They<br />

used items like those employed by Wright <strong>and</strong> his colleagues (for example, “Absinthe<br />

is: a liqueur or a precious stone?”), as well as other kinds of items — for<br />

example, items in which subjects had to indicate which cause of death was more<br />

common in the United States (for example, appendicitis, or pregnancy, abortion, <strong>and</strong>

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