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Thinking and Deciding

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ATTENTIONAL BIAS 187<br />

Table 8.2: Incidence of symptom (S) <strong>and</strong> disease (D) for 100 patients<br />

Disease present Disease absent<br />

Symptom present 37 17<br />

Symptom absent 33 13<br />

From such a table, it is possible to determine whether a correlation exists between<br />

the symptom <strong>and</strong> the disease. In this case, the symptom is not correlated at all with<br />

the disease. Out of 54 patients who have the symptom, 37 have the disease, about<br />

69%. Out of 46 patients who do not have the symptom, 33 have the disease, about<br />

72%. A given patient has about a 70% chance of having the disease, whether this<br />

patient has the symptom or not. The symptom is useless in determining who has the<br />

disease <strong>and</strong> who does not, in this group of patients.<br />

Nonetheless, 85% of the nurses said that there was a relationship between the<br />

symptom <strong>and</strong> the disease. Smedslund presented the subjects with other kinds of relationships.<br />

For example, by switching the 17 <strong>and</strong> the 13, a real (if weak) relationship<br />

between symptom <strong>and</strong> disease was created. Here, the nurses were no more likely to<br />

think there was a relationship than they were in the original case. Smedslund found<br />

that the best predictor of the subjects’ judgment of relationship was the proportion<br />

of the total number of cases in the upper left-h<strong>and</strong> cell. If the symptom <strong>and</strong> disease<br />

were both frequently “present” (as indicated by high figures in that cell), subjects<br />

tended to think that there was a relationship. Subjects seem to attend largely to this<br />

cell, when they should (normatively) have been attending to the whole table.<br />

As Nisbett <strong>and</strong> Ross point out (1980, p. 92), the reasoning exhibited by these<br />

subjects is much like that of many laypeople when they discuss a proposition such<br />

as “Does God answer prayers?”<br />

‘Yes,’ such a person may say, ‘because many times I’ve asked God for<br />

something, <strong>and</strong> He’s given it to me.’ Such a person is accepting the data<br />

from the present/present cell as conclusive evidence for the covariation<br />

proposition. A more sophisticated layperson may counter this logic by<br />

asking for the data from the present/absent cell (i.e., prayers present,<br />

positive outcome absent): ‘Have you ever asked God for something <strong>and</strong><br />

not gotten it?’<br />

In fact (Nisbett <strong>and</strong> Ross point out), even these two cells are not enough. If positive<br />

outcomes are just as likely to occur when we do not pray for them as when we do,<br />

there is still no relationship. We need to know the absent/present <strong>and</strong> absent/absent<br />

cells, the ones at the bottom of the table, as well as the two others.<br />

Many other experiments have supported Smedslund’s general conclusion that<br />

subjects tend to ignore part of the table. In asking whether a symptom predicts a

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