Thinking and Deciding

TYPES OF JUDGMENT 393
of opposing arguments). Aside from the harm done in forcing people to do anything,
we cannot be sure that we ourselves have unique access to the right answers. (In this
way, morality is no different from science. No scientist can be sure of believing the
best theory either, although some theories are better than others.)
Granting that we should not exterminate our moral opponents or prevent them
from speaking freely, it seems inconsistent not to try to influence other people. If
we are willing to act on our moral beliefs ourselves, impersonality requires that we
be willing to try to induce others to act on them as well, within the limits set by our
beliefs about tolerance, freedom of expression, and following the law. Again, this
requirement stems from the premise that true moral judgments apply to everyone.
Moral judgments can be impersonal without being simple, crude, or insensitive
to conditions. It is not inconsistent to think that walking down Main Street in a
bikini is acceptable in Monaco but not in Mecca. The expectations of people, and
what offends them, can matter too. When we say that a judgment applies to anyone
in the “same situation,” the description of the situation can be quite rich, so long as
it does not include people’s names.
In sum, moral judgments can be seen as expressing principles or norms that we
want others to follow. These expressions are like imperative statements because they
recommend action to others. They are impersonal because they apply to anyone
in exactly the same situation. They gain their persuasive power in part from their
impersonality. When people recommend rules for everyone, including themselves,
these recommendations do not seem to arise from mere self-interest alone. Taken at
face value, they are meant to apply to those who make them as well as to others. If
we take this restriction seriously, then it would be rational for us to recommend rules
that benefit everyone, that is, rules that help all of us — including ourselves — to
achieve our goals.
Types of judgment
Moral judgments can be understood by comparing them to closely related judgments,
with which they are often confused. The analysis of types of judgment grew out
of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1970), who, in turn, was influenced by Jean
Piaget. In the tradition of Piaget, Kohlberg argued that moral judgment develops
through three levels (each level subdivided into two stages). At the lowest level,
young children do not distinguish morality from self-interest. Asked whether a man
should steal a drug to save his wife’s life, children at this level will argue in terms of
the man’s interest, either in having his wife alive or in avoiding punishment.
Morality versus convention
At the middle, “conventional,” level, children make the distinction between morality
and self-interest, but they confuse morality with social convention, with what is expected
or approved or condoned by law. Thus, people who reason at this level would