Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

4. Conclusion
Reduction Revisited: The Ontological Level, the Conceptual Level, and the Tenets of Physicalism — Markus Gole
To come to an end, a priori physicalism is committed to
both, an ontological and a conceptual reduction. Thereby,
an ideal amount of parsimony, elegance and simplicity has
been accomplished. In contrast, a posteriori physicalism,
prima facie, does not require a conceptual reduction.
However, as I have argued, denying the need for a conceptual
reduction is in tension with the tenets of physicalism,
viz. parsimony, elegance and simplicity. Moreover, an
inherent problem for a posteriori physicalists is to give an
adequate account of how mental concepts can be independent
from physical concepts and at the same time be
some kind of special physical concepts. In conclusion, my
analysis suggests that a priori physicalism is the best option
for defending the view that there is nothing over and
above the physical. Thus, a posteriori physicalism should
be rejected in favor of a priori physicalism.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Johann Marek and Michael Matzer for
very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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