Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

phenomenal concept of experiencing red. This is because
brain state p2, which is my experience of red, was
causally responsible for p1. Ex hypothesi, p1 and p2 are
distinct physical states. This would make it possible for a
neuroscientist to stimulate p1 while ensuring that p2 is left
inert. But what exactly is happening in this scenario? If it
is anything like the water case, I will think that I’m entertaining
a phenomenal concept that refers to p2 but I will
actually be deploying a nonphenomenal concept of the
neuroscientist’s electrical stimulation. This means that I
will mistakenly believe that I am thinking ‘phenomenally’
about experiencing red when I am actually thinking nonphenomenally
about something else.
If we accept Kripke’s observation that there is no
reality / appearance distinction when it comes to our
phenomenology then this seems highly implausible. But
more importantly, it is imperative that the phenomenal
concept strategist develop an account of phenomenal
concepts that is genuinely phenomenal and Levin, by
keeping her account physically respectable, loses touch
with this crucial feature. She preserves (ii) at the
expense of (i). This shortcoming points us to a different
account, one that makes the relationship between the
phenomenal concept and the object it denotes much
tighter.
David Papineau’s account of quasi-quotational
phenomenal concepts discharges this duty. His idea is to
analyze phenomenal concepts as a species of
perceptual concepts. Consider my ability to perceptually
identify a flower and make judgments about it. I might be
able to think ‘that flower’ is beautiful when looking at a
tulip. I have, at my disposal, a visual sensory template
that I can use to recognize tulips. This template,
however, is not only useful for thinking about external
objects like tulips, but it is also useful for thinking about
internal objects like my conscious awareness of the tulip.
When we attend to our experiences we use the
experiences themselves to think about them. The crucial
feature of phenomenal concepts is that they will always
deploy an instance of the experience they are about.
That is, they use the denoted experiences in order to
mention them. Papineau writes:
“This means that any exercise of a phenomenal
concept to think about a perceptual experience
will inevitably involve either that experience itself
or an imaginary recreation of that experience. If
we count imaginary recreations as ‘versions’ of
the experience being imagined, then we can say
that the phenomenal thinking about a given experience
will always use a version of that experience
in order to mention that experience.”
(Papineau 2007, 124)
The problem with this view is that it seems to leave no
room for any kind of physical explanation. The phenomenal
property that the phenomenal concept is about
is literally a part of the concept itself; as such the traditional
distinction between representation and represented
object that made it possible to specify an explanation
in terms of causal / historical correlation between
the two has been obliterated. It seems that the special
kind of cognitive presence that Papineau’s account provides
must be explained by the physical presence of the
experience alone. But does this really count as an explanation
or is this better characterized as a stipulation?
A Critique of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy — Daniel Lim
Dualist Illusion
I believe Chalmers’ dilemma is real and must be addressed.
But even if a path can be cut between the
horns of this dilemma it is far from clear that the phenomenal
concept strategy has adequately accounted for
(iii). For ease of exposition I will use the ‘explanatory
gap’ (Levine 2001) as an instance of the dualist intuition.
The existence of this gap is something defenders of the
phenomenal concept strategy readily admit. Their claim
is not that the gap can be bridged but that its existence
can be explained.
Let’s begin by thinking about a classic optical
illusion based on human color constancy known as the
‘checker shadow illusion’. A subject is shown what
appears to be a black and white checkerboard with a
cylinder on it that is casting a diagonal shadow across
the middle of the board. The squares are actually
different shades of gray and the image is constructed so
that the ‘white’ squares in the shadow are the same
shade as the ‘black’ squares outside the shadow.
Despite being the same shade the squares appear to be
very different. The standard explanation for this illusion
has two parts. The first is that our visual system keys in
on local contrasts – a square that is lighter than its
immediate neighbors is considered ‘lighter than
average’. So the mere fact that the square in the shadow
is surrounded by darker squares and the square outside
the shadow is surrounded by lighter squares contributes
to the illusion. The second part is that shadows often
have soft edges while painted boundaries have hard
edges. Our visual system tends to ignore gradual
changes in lighting in order to determine the color of the
surfaces involved without being misled by shadows. In
the image, the cylinder’s shadow is deliberately made
fuzzy to add to this effect.
What we have here is a satisfying explanation for
the existence of the checker shadow illusion. A vital
feature of this explanation is that it does not presuppose
the illusion in order to explain it. By exposing the
tendencies of our visual system to key in on local
contrasts and import generic information concerning
boundaries, a non-circular explanation of the illusion is
provided. The question is whether phenomenal concepts
provide such an explanation for the explanatory gap.
David Papineau claims that it does. He locates the
source of the explanatory gap in the absence of a use /
mention distinction regarding phenomenal concepts. The
use / mention distinction is present in a majority of our
nonphenomenal concepts but it is peculiarly absent
when we think phenomenally. As already gestured at
above, it is the way we think about phenomenal
properties that makes it seem as though we are
apprehending their essences and consequently intuiting
phenomenal properties as ontologically distinct from
anything physical. Phenomenal concepts literally contain
the properties that they conceptualize so it is no wonder
why we can disassociate the physical descriptions of the
properties from the first hand experiences of the
properties themselves. Papineau writes:
“There is a sense in which material concepts do
‘leave out’ the feelings. Uses of them do not in
any way activate the experiences in question, by
contrast with uses of phenomenal concepts …
After all, most concepts don’t use or involve the
things they refer to. When I think of being rich,
say, or having measles, this doesn’t in any sense
make me rich or give me measles.”
(Papineau 2007, 136)
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