Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

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psychological hedonism oriented at the present (the
pleasure or annoyance experienced at the present
determine our course of action),
psychological hedonism oriented at the past (our
current decision are determined by the pleasures
and annoyances experienced in the past).
W. Tatarkiewicz, the Polish philosopher, describes the
discussed theory in that manner:
everything what we do, we do with a view on the future,
we need solely a pleasure,
if we need to do something, we do it solely for the
sake of pleasure,
the desire of pleasure is one of the main human motives
and it directs us in our decisions,
pleasure is the aim of all human efforts.
Independently of all these versions, for all adherents of
psychological hedonism, the principle “people avoid pain
and desire pleasure” is a descriptive one, which covers
some psychological facts and characterizes human motives,
reasons and behavior. Such is its epistemological
status. I don’t inquire into the truth of this principle. The
problem involves another question. - What will happen if
we give normative character to the above rule? Then, a
judgment about facts will change its meaning. It will turn
into a judgment about duty. But, the sentence “people
experience some pleasure and pain” is different from
“people ought to aim at pleasure and to avoid pain”. If we
assume the identity of these two sentences, then we will
pass from epistemological and psychological considerations
to the normative level of our reflection. According to
the descriptive principle people organize their lives. According
to the normative principle people should organize
their lives. For the utilitarians a transition (from the psychological
level to the normative one) will be possible, provided
that the factual values are perceived by people as
superior aims of human conduct and are actually respected
by them.
The world of factual values will be identified with the
world of human purposes. But, to do it, we have to
transcend individual, empirical experience and to extend
the human knowledge by a contents which exceeds
empirical data. This content must be derived from another
source. If so, the empirical approach is insufficient. But
utilitarian theory assumed that empirical data was the only
possible one. Thus, we should reject that thesis, because
it is incompatible.
We have approached the basic problem of utilitarian
reduction called the naturalistic fallacy. What does this
fallacy mean (in the case of utilitarian thinking)? Let’s
appeal to J.S. Mill and his argumentations included in the
fourth chapter of “Utilitarianism”. According to him, the only
proof of that some object is visible is that it is viewed by
people. Thus the only proof that an object is desirable is
that it is desired. The above argumentation is based on an
analogy between epistemology and ethics, an analogy
assumed by J.S. Mill. The epistemology, based on the
sense of perception, would be impossible if it predicated
on things which have never been seen by anybody. Ethics
would be in practice unacceptable if it pertained to such
desirable aims, which nobody has never desired. But, the
judgment “the visual perception of some object confirms its
capability of being visible” is not equivalent to the judgment
“the desire of something confirms its desirability”. Because
from the fact that something is desired doesn’t follow that it
is worthy of being desired. From the fact, that something is
desired follows solely that it is capable to being desired.
Reductionism in Axiology: the Case of Utilitarianism — Dorota Probucka
J.S. Mill’s intention was to identify the word “desirable” with
the phrase “worthy of being desired”. In this case, the
naturalistic fallacy rests on indistinguishing what is from
what ought to be and it is based on ambiguity of the word
“desirable”. Duties do not follow from facts. An attribute of
things worthy of being desired is that there some people
who desired them. But, this does not imply that all things
desired by people are worthy of being desired. The fact
that something is desired is not sufficient to prove that it is
worthy of being desired. From the judgment “people desire
pleasure” does not follow the opinion that pleasure ought
to be the aim of human action and, secondly, that the
pleasure ought to be desired every time, everywhere and
by everybody.
Let’s recall the opinion of J. Dewey. According to
him, desires are merely desires and that’s all what we can
say about them. None of psychological theories is
sufficient to build the general theory of values. In utilitarian
axiology, the conclusion drawn from the psychological
inquiries and the description of the human desires are
identified with the evaluation of these states of affairs.
Let’s repeat, description is identified with evaluation. That
is a primary mistake of all utilitarian hedonistic thinking.
Another important issue involves the possibility of
experience of sadistic pleasures, such which are the
source of the human pain. According to J. Bentham, there
are people who have done something with ill intention.
Let’s call it malevolence, jealousy, cruelty. Their motive of
action will be always some kind of pleasure. It will be the
pleasure which people experience when they think of
somebody’s pain. That unworthy pleasure is good in itself,
as well. It may be undignified but it is as good as any
other. There are no better or worse pleasures. The value
of pleasures is connected entirely with their intensity. Thus,
if sadism is a source of our pleasure it ought to be
recommended. If we are pleased with the sadistic acting
we ought to prefer it. Such conclusion ensues from the
assumption that pleasure could be the only basis of
axiology and ethics.
The next problem connected with reduction in
axiology is presented by R. Nozick. Generally, this problem
concerns what happens if we reduce all values to
pleasurable states. R. Nozick describes some hypothetical
situation. Let’s assume, that we are in a special
constructed machinery which provides abilities for
experience of many pleasures. Neurologists stimulate, by
means of electrodes, our brains in such way that we feel
again and again sensual pleasure. Do we want to live in
such constructed machinery? R. Nozick gives a negative
answer to such a question. According to him, all of us wish
to be persons, somebody more than only the object of
positive sensations. Therefore, a valuable life is something
more that the sum of pleasurable experiences. If we agree
with the philosopher in this matter we will have to admit
that axiology, based on the primacy of individual
experience, makes the axiological sphere very poor. That
way of thinking reduces possibilities of men’s evolution
because it does not invite to philosophical inquiries. Poor
axiology makes human life shallow and degrades a human
being. The rule “people ought to pursue of pleasurable
states” reduces the human seeking for sense of life solely
to one sensual sphere.
To sum up, hedonistic utilitarianism has reduced
human life to the pursuit of pleasurable states. Such
thinking has treated one value as the only one and the
most important one. Thus, pleasure has gained a
monopolistic position in the realm of values at the costs of
other values. N. Hartmann has compared it to the