Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

Are Tractarian Objects Whitehead’s Pure Potentials?
Piotr Żuchowski, Łódź, Poland
Without doubt Whitehead and Wittgenstein construct their
philosophies from different perspectives. It’s enough to
consider the way they treat language: for Whitehead
language is not transparent as it is for Wittgenstein –
there’s no any isomorphism or homomorphism between
the world and language as one can find it in Tractatus.
One cannot reveal ultimate constituents of reality by
process of logical analysis of language. Basically such an
analysis can disclose no more than fundamental
presuppositions, prejudices trenched in scientific and
common-sense minds of a given epoch. However, despite
all the differences there’s striking parallel between both
systems. What may be astonishing is that one can find just
a few works exploring these parallels (if any concerning
ontological aspects of both systems).
I assume that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains a
kind of ontological system. To put it other words:
Wittgenstein wanted to say something about the very
structure of reality. Hence Fact Ontology which is stated in
the thesis that the world divides into facts is not mere
counterpart of logical analysis of language but it is an
explicit ontological position, though analysis of language is
the only way we can apply to get to that position. One can
find, however, various interpretations of the thesis 1.2.
There are two main: the first - let me name it “extensional”
- is based on the assumption that facts merely determine
the scope (extension) of the world but facts are not the
final constituents of reality – these are objects which are
usually supposed to be kind of substances. Thus 1.2 says
no more than to know all facts is to know all objects that
are included in the world – all facts determine all objects
but not conversely [1.11, 1.12]. The second interpretation -
“contentual” - holds that facts are the final constituents of
reality, the reality is made of facts. Then the problem what
Tractarian objects are immediately arises to its fullest
extent. In this case one can also find opposite views.
Nominalistic interpretation (which is supplied by the
extensional interpretation mentioned above) holds that
objects are individual things, while realistic interpretation
holds that there are not only individual things among
objects but also properties and relations (ie. traditional
universals). Neither of above interpretations presupposes
that we can point out examples of objects or that we have
direct acquaintance with them.
I would like to propose the third probable
interpretation of Tractarian objects according to which
there are no individual things among objects (substances
that bear qualities) but just entities that philosophical
tradition generally considered to be universals (i.e.
properties and relations). This is what ontology of facts
holds – the world consist of facts, not of things. Objects are
derivative beings, they exist only as constituents of facts,
though they are not parts of facts. Facts do not have any
material, concrete parts they could be spilt into. This is why
one can find two modes of existence in Tractatus: the first
(primary) that belongs to facts, which are existing state of
affairs [2], the second (derivative) is proper to the
substance of the world and is indicated as subsistence
[2.024]. Objects can enter into the world only as elements
of facts. They are thus abstract aspects of facts. It follows
that there are no substances or other entities, which
endure their existence on the successive moments of time.
Momentary facts are thus ultimate bricks of reality, and
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objects are their necessary elements but they are not
primal, they do not build the reality. However strange it
may seem at first sight, this kind of antisubstanialistic
position is developed in Whitehead's process metaphysics,
it also corresponds better to the view of reality derived
from modern physics.
In Process and Reality Whitehead introduces eight
categories of existence, of which so called actual
occasions (referred here as facts) are fundamental. They
are the final realities (the only reasons). Entities that
belong to remaining seven categories exist only as
elements of facts. This applies primarily to eternal objects
(referred further as EO), which are also described as forms
of definiteness or pure potentials and which seem to me
correspond directly to Tractarian objects.
Now, if we admit interpretation introduced above all
striking parallels between Whitehead’s and Wittgenstein
ontologies shall emerge. Due to the lack of space I shall
confine myself in this paper basically to discussing those
parallels which are related to characteristics of Tractarian
objects and Whiteheadian EOs, though some other
relevant similarities will also be mentioned.
In the first place let’s consider the problem of
change. As it was mentioned above since facts should be
momentary they cannot be subject of change. Momentary
does not mean that they are not time-extended,
geometrical point-like, since it is impossible to construct
extension from unextended parts. Facts are out of time,
they cannot remain identical in the successive moments.
Time is derivative from the succession of time moments
constituted by facts coming into being. They become and
perish. Thus the slightest “change” means we are dealing
with another fact. For both philosophers some kind of
(eternal) objects are necessary to provide the stability of
world-structures and to avoid heraklitean consequences of
a total flux of all things [2.026]. What undergo changes
then is the structure, configuration of objects, ie. state of
affairs, or to use Whiteheadian terms, the pattern made of
EO which differs in successive facts by some of its
elements. The change consists in adding or loosing an
object to some state of affairs leading by necessity to a
new situation. Hence if we talk about subject of change,
we have to refer to complex which is identical in the
successive facts. This complex, however, does not endure,
since it is not in time, it can be said to “haunt” time - or to
use more proper Whiteheadian term - it just ingresses into
successive facts (it is thus connected to time in a different
manner than facts). It seems an inevitable consequence
for Fact Ontology to conceive time as atomic, quantified,
consisting of discrete epochs constituted by facts (in
opposition to substance ontologies for which continuous
time seems to be more natural) and hence it is bluntly
absurd on the ground of Fact Ontology to ask what is in
time. According to Whitehead internal relations between
facts provide that common characteristics can be inherited
by effect from the cause. This element of mutual relations
of facts is absent in Tractatus and exposed in process
metaphysics, nevertheless in both systems the totality of
objects with their internal relations constitutes the
substance of the world conceived as enunciated above.
It follows also that no new objects become, the
substance is given once for ever. In this respect it is