Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

I agree that I do not have to have measles in order to
think about measles. In fact, in most cases, I don’t. I can
think of the disease in terms of its characteristic symptoms,
its scientific classification rubeola or even its distinction
from smallpox among other things. But, of
course, it is also possible to think about measles while
actually having measles. I can think, using a typedemonstrative,
‘this disease’, where I use the disease I
currently have in order to mention it. If Papineau is right,
juxtaposing this type-demonstrative concept with my
ordinary measles concept should generate an illusion of
distinctness. It is this ‘special way’ of thinking that creates
the fallacious impression that other ways of thinking
about measles fail to refer to the measles themselves.
But is this at all convincing? Despite the absence of the
use / mention distinction in my measles typedemonstrative
I have no dualist illusions. I don’t find
myself thinking that I’m dealing with two ontologically
distinct entities.
Since the absence of a use / mention distinction is
a characteristic of certain nonphenomenal typedemonstratives
that do not engender a dualist illusion,
the absence of the distinction cannot be used to explain
the illusion in the case of phenomenal concepts. Without
offering a principled distinction between typedemonstratives
like ‘this disease’ as opposed to ‘this
experience’ there is no reason to think that a satisfying
explanation for our dualist intuitions has been given. Of
course one can appeal to the peculiarity of the
phenomenal property itself in contrast to the property of
being rubeola but this would presuppose the explanatory
gap, not explain it. This move effectively eliminates the
possibility of satisfying (iii) and it is a failure of the
phenomenal concept strategy that is often overlooked.
Most debates concerning the strategy assume that (iii) is
adequately addressed, but further examination shows
that this is a mistake. Referring to the absence of the
use / mention distinction to explain our dualist intuitions
simply does not work.
206
A Critique of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy — Daniel Lim
Conclusion
The phenomenal concept strategy faces some serious
problems. Chalmers’ dilemma is real, that is, it does not
seem that (i) and (ii) can consistently be held together in
a single account. However, even if this dilemma can be
resolved it cannot account for (iii) because it does not
provide us with a satisfying non-circular explanation for
the dualist illusion.
Literature
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