Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

independent of what is the fact, facts cannot affect the web
of objects (though even here one could find some points
for discussion). More, since the substance comprises all
possibilities, every possible world, no matter how different
from ours, should have the same substance.
The congruence of both ontologies seems even
deeper when we consider characteristic of (eternal)
objects.
Whitehead gives twofold characteristics of EO:
Individual essence of EO determines its particular, unique
individuality; for example red colour (particular shade of
red) is what it is without any reference or relation to other
beings whatsoever (facts, objects). The same colour may
determine entities in many different ways staying identical
self. To put it other words, no matter how given EO
ingresses into actuality, how it is realised, each time it
provides identical unique contribution to reality. EO is thus
transcendent in respect to every actual entity, its relations
to facts are external to it. In this sense EO is abstract – but
to be abstract does not mean to be disconnected from a
fact.
Transcendence described above is a reason why we
should think of EO as relations rather than properties (beside
the fact that Whiteheadian facts are not substances
that may gain or loose properties). Relations, contrary to
properties, cannot be ascribed to one object, thus EOs are
relations with many arguments that transcend each of
them. Now, one of the main points of Whiteheads philosophical
objection is so called theory of simple location, according
to which all entities are related to space in a simple
manner, that is one and only one location can be ascribed
to them (no matter whether we take absolute or relative
space). For Whitehead ingression of EO into actuality
yields complicated web of their relations to space (different
for example in a mirror image or in a simple perception of a
red object). Whitehead stresses that relations are primal to
properties. EO’s ingression into actuality is not embodiment
of a property in a thing (since there are no things) but
it relates facts. It does not mean that EOs are relations as
such (at least) not all of them, but that they are by their
nature relational, contrary to properties which are private
(excluding) in character. To point location of EO one has to
point the whole web of relations (ex. I see here a green
leaf being there).
EOs as pure potentials for determination have to be
in mutual relations among themselves. It stems from their
pure potentiality that all possible relations to other EOs
should be included in it - every relationship, which is
possible, is thereby in the realm of possibility. It belongs to
their essence that they can jointly determine facts. There
are two types of EOs: simple and complex. Ingression of
simple EOs does not necessarily imply ingression of other
EOs, though “in fact” EOs always determine facts as
patterns. There have to be simple EOs that are the
fundaments of each hierarchy of patterns. Similarly in
Tractatus there have to be objects which are simple, they
do not comprise other objects. The web of mutual relations
of EO is their relational essence. Its function is twofold: it
determines all relations of given EO to all other EO and it
also includes general possibility of determining facts.
General means here that no EO simple or complex could
be a cause of how matters really happen. So it belongs to
EO’s nature to be generally realizable, otherwise they
would be nonentities.
The above characteristic corresponds almost
entirely to Wittgensteinian characteristic of objects. On the
one hand they have form which consists of relations to
Are Tractarian Objects Whitehead’s Pure Potentials? — Piotr Żuchowski
other objects. It is essential for objects that they should be
constituents of possible states of affairs, and the form
consists of all possible configurations, no other possible
configurations are left to be found or added later, there is
nothing accidental in the form. Relations to other objects
are then internal to the object. Object have relational
essence, it is their internal structure. This structure is
independent of what is the case, the actual flow of things
cannot affect the structure, otherwise there would be
nothing stable in the reality. On the other hand the
substance of the world is not only form but also content
[2.025]. The content should consist of some internal
qualities other than the logical structure: for example
redness as a first-order internal quality and being a color
which could be conceived as a second-order quality i.e.
internal structure determining what composition may the
red color come into (Stenius 1981: 79-81). These internal
qualities could correspond to individual essence of EO.
But there is a problem with the above characteristic.
As 2.0231 states, if two objects have the same logical
form, the only distinction between them, apart from their
external properties, is that they are different (external
properties mean here being a component of existing sate
of affairs). It follows that the form excludes other individual
characteristic of an object whatsoever. All properties of an
object are relational, object possesses them only with
respect to other objects, being a component of all possible
states of affairs. An object as such is undifferentiated from
other objects. How then objects obtain their individuality?
Are they to be conceived as points of geometrical plane –
each point is individual only due to infinite boundle of
relations to other points (ie. due to its relational essence).
This consequence is accepted by nominalistic
interpretation mentioned above (Wolniewicz 1968: 85).
Similarly Whitehead holds that in isolation EOs are
undifferentiated nonentities. More, according to Whitehead
relational essence is not unique to a given EO, each EO
stands in a uniform web of relations. No matter which
system we consider one can ask then, what determines
which relations are possible and which are not? Could
laws of reality, of logic be different? How “rich” is the
structure: are there only logical relations of exclusion,
implication and are objects only kind of logical variables in
these relations?
Another difficulty I should point out is connected with
the interpretation of Fact Ontology according to which
primary mode of existence belong exclusively to facts,
other entities are derivative beings. If it is so, then one can
protest that there could not be any unalterable substance
of the world, which after all seems to be necessary
element. That’s the reason why Whitehead postulates that
there should be a primordial fact that valuates whole
multiplicity of EOs, establishing all possible connections
among mere multiplicity of EOs. Whitehead describes it as
a kind of primordial God’s vision and regards such an
entity indispensable element of any sound metaphysics. It
seems to me however that this primordial valuation can be
conceived as an act of establishing Laws of Nature for a
given reality, setting up boundary conditions by some
quantum fluctuations from which our reality begins as it is
described in some multiverse cosmological scenarios. It
follows that this primordial fact introduces a matrix that
would serve as a substance by providing a stable structure
determining facts coming into being. However, if substance
of the world is to be something common to all possible
worlds, it requires that objects, which are to be connected,
should have some content - internal qualities other than
the logical structure, as I tried to argue.
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