Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

“Downward Causation”: Emergent, Reducible or Non-Existent? — Peter P. Kirschenmann
I also think that especially living beings, in which
physical constituents are continuously replaced, are
patterns of coordination and integration of processes
rather than substances. Yet, for understanding them, it is
inessential whether one considers molecules as entities or,
in their turn again, as patterned field processes.
There are a number of alternative proposals
concerning emergence, supervenience and “downward
causation”, which I cannot take up here.
5. Yet Another Computer Analogy
Analogies with (information processes in) computers have
been very conspicuous in the philosophy of mind. They
can be instructive for our present issues. Software – programs,
essentially algorithms – can be multiply realized in
diverse computers. No one would call the algorithms
‘emergent’; they get artificially, thus contingently, imposed
on the hardware, whereas in natural systems one supposes
some lawful connections.
A computer runs through a series of physical states
which is isomorphous to the logical steps in the algorithm
(cf. Jongeling 1997). Clearly, the algorithmic program
determines the physical operation of the computer, but we
need not call it a ‘downward determination’. How a
computer, say, can do a calculation, must be reductively
explained in terms of electronics. The logics of the
program, however, is apriori establishable, not even in
need of being reduced to electronics.
Without pretending to solve the riddle of the mind, I
want to draw some analogies. Our experiencing and
thinking depends on our “hardware”: when we are tired, we
“cannot think straight”. Furthermore, thoughts or
experiences do not causally follow upon each other, but
rather in dependence of their content. For instance, when
making plans, our thinking proceeds by association or
goal-directed deliberation, albeit not algorithmically. Still, I
should say that the “logics” of such thought processes can
be understood in themselves and need not be reduced to
brain processes. How precisely they are realized in the
brain, is the riddle. Yet, given that the relation between
thoughts is not causal, the inference to a “downward”
causal influence cannot even get started.
Thoughts, no doubt, play a role in determining
(changes of) states of our brain and body, as well as,
when plans get realized, meaningful macroscopic
alterations in the physical world. As in the case of the
vaguely comparable Bénard cells, I conclude that we
should speak here at most of ‘downward determination’
and certainly not of ‘downward causation’.
Literature
Anderson, P.B., Emmeche, C., Finnemannn, N.O. and
Christiansen, P.V. (eds.) 2000 Downward Causation. Minds, Bodies,
Matter, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Bickhard, M.H. with Campbell, R.L. 2000 “Emergence”, in: Andersen
et al. (eds.) 2000, 322-348.
Emmeche, C., Køppe, S. and Stjernfelt, F. 2000 “Levels, Emergence,
and Three Versions of Downward Causation”, in: Andersen
et al. 2000, 13-34.
Hulswit, M. 2006 “How Causal is Downward Causation?”, Journal
for the General Philosophy of Science 36, 261-287.
Jongeling, B. 1997 “Wat is reductionisme?”, in: W.B. Drees (red.),
De mens: meer dan materie? Religie en reductionisme, Kampen:
Kok, 38-54.
McLaughlin, B., Bennett, K. 2005 “Supervenience”,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/
Ripley, C. 1984 “Sperry’s Concept of Consciousness”, Inquiry 27,
399-423.
Rockwell, T. 1998 “A Defense of Emergent Downward Causation”
http://users.california.com/~mcmf/causeweb.html
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