Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

332
A Division in Mind. The Misconceived Distinction between Psychological and Phenomenal Properties — Matthias Stefan
all parts of the mental realm are reducible to entities in the
physical realm (Kim 2005, 170-171). As there only remains
a small epiphenomenal residue, according to Kim, we
have got something near enough to physicalism (Kim
2005, 174).
3. The division reconsidered
I want to reconsider this distinction between psychological
and phenomenal properties. I argue that this distinction
circumvents appropriate understanding and explaining
human behaviour and cognitive capacities. There seems
to be a fatal flaw in distinguishing between properties that
play a causal role and those that are just raw feelings.
To start with, I cannot find proper arguments
Chalmers and Kim allege for the posed distinction. It rather
seems they take the distinction between phenomenal and
psychological properties for granted. Arguments such as
the argument from qualia inversion (Kim 2005, 169-170) or
from zombies (Chalmers 1996, e.g. 94-99) are no
arguments for the distinction itself, but rather presuppose
it. To make it conceivable that there could be zombies,
acting like us but feeling nothing, and that there could be
inverted qualia, you feeling pain and me feeling itching but
both acting the same, one needs to already have accepted
the presupposed distinction between phenomenal and
psychological properties. In order to agree with such
scenarios one has to accept what is at question here.
What is there of the presupposed distinction between
phenomenal and psychological properties? Why should we
show pain-behaviour, if there was nothing like the feeling
of pain itself? Or why should we show pain behaviour, if
there was the feeling of desperation?
I want to argue against this distinction with two
arguments: First, in explaining human behaviour we have
to refer to the phenomenal aspect. Second, human
cognitive capacities can only be understood properly if the
distinction in question is given up.
First argument: It seems wrong to claim, as
Chalmers and Kim do, that we can explain human
behaviour appropriately if we only refer to psychological
properties leaving out what it's like to be in those states.
According to them, the concept of pain, for instance, refers
to two kinds of properties: There is a property involved that
is caused by tissue damage, for instance, and causes pain
behaviour, certain believes, desires etc. This psychological
property can be identified with some physical state. Every
time this property is instantiated there also occurs a
second property (Chalmers 1996, 17), namely the pain-feel
that has no causal effects whatsoever. This view on the
matter, however, is highly artificial. In case of machines
this assumption might be true. We can explain the
behaviour of machines in purely psychological terms, i.e.
by pointing out the physical mechanisms that are activated
by certain causes and having themselves a causal role.
Explaining why a robot is behaving the way he does, it
suffices to point out the causal mechanism that underlies
its behaviour.
In case of humans however, we cannot
understandably explain her behaviour by simply pointing at
purely psychological properties and leaving out what it's
like to be in a certain state. We act because of the painfeeling,
instead of it being some unnecessary adjunct. If
the feeling of pain did not occur, pain-behaviour also
wouldn’t. The crucial point is that we would not understand
why someone behaves the way she does, if we do not
account for her phenomenal feeling. To give another
example, we would not understand why a cheated
husband behaves the way he does in presence of the
adulterer if we leave out his hate, frustration and jealousy.
His actions are only comprehensible by knowing what its
like to be jealous and hating someone. According to Kim
and Chalmers, in contrast, the poor husband's behaviour
would be explained by a psychological property and
therefore ultimately by a physical mechanism: He behaves
the way he does because there is a causal mechanism
going on in his physical system. Within such a framework,
however, rational understanding of human behaviour is
made impossible. Leaving out what it's like is nothing short
of obstructing the understanding of human behaviour and
actions. This is not to claim that we act as we do because
of the phenomenal feeling instead of the intentional states.
Rather, in case of humans, there is no distinction here.
This should become clear if we contrast human
behaviour with the behaviour of machines. In case of
machines we understand why they behave the way they
do if we know what kind of mechanism is at work. In case
of humans, however, there is a totally different way of
understanding. We give up rational understanding another
human person's behaviour if we overlook what it's like for
someone to be in that state. There might be resemblance
to human behaviour when a machine reacts in a way that
is similar to pain behaviour. In fact, however, two different
things are going on, namely human pain behaviour on the
one hand and purely mechanical reactions resembling
pain behaviour on the other. If we talk about “machine
behaviour”, we are using the concept of behaviour in an
equivocal way.
Second argument: Jonathan Lowe criticizes
Chalmers because he cannot explain human cognitive
capacities appropriately (Lowe 1995). According to Lowe
to understand (most) human cognitive capacities one has
to consider its phenomenal part. Describing the abilities to
discriminate, categorize, react to the environment, etc. in
purely functional terms can only explain phenomena
occurring in case of machines. Explaining machine
behaviour this way, however, is trivial (Lowe 1995, 270).
Lowe gives the example of experience to show that
one cannot distinguish between phenomenal properties
with no causal role and a psychological mechanism that
properly explains representation. Experience is not just a
phenomenal property occurring in case of representing the
environment. Rather the representation itself is a
phenomenal representation: “Not only is it ‘like something’
to enjoy such an experience, in which the phenomenal
character of sensed colours impresses itself upon our
awareness, but also such an experience represents – or,
better, presents – our immediate physical environment as
being some way” (ibid.). Representing spatial facts, for
instance, such as the height of a plain, its shape, etc., is
always phenomenal representation. So the intentional and
conceptual content of experience is intimately tied to the
phenomenal aspect of representation: “The importance of
all this lies in the fact that how we conceive of physical
objects is inextricably bound up with how they appear to us
in perception” (Lowe 1995, 268). If Chalmers and Kim
define human representation as psychological properties
and therefore in purely functional terms, they oversee that
human representation is always given in a certain
phenomenal way. A purely functional description of
environmental representation might be appropriate for
information processing, storage and retrieval of machines,
but it is not appropriate in the case of humans.
The example of experience shows that in human
mind the phenomenal and the intentional aspect are not