02.11.2012 Views

Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

4. Conclusion<br />

So do bra<strong>in</strong>s th<strong>in</strong>k or don’t <strong>the</strong>y? B&H th<strong>in</strong>k not, <strong>and</strong> I have<br />

argued that <strong>the</strong>ir conclusion does not depend on <strong>the</strong>ir specifically<br />

Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>ian account of contemporary neuroscience.<br />

The proposition can be denied, as a category<br />

mistake, from an alternative descriptive-metaphysical approach.<br />

I th<strong>in</strong>k B&H’s arguments are stronger than Searle’s<br />

critique of <strong>the</strong>m. But <strong>the</strong> Qu<strong>in</strong>ean po<strong>in</strong>t made above<br />

disrupts <strong>the</strong> neat conceptual taxonomy. The way <strong>in</strong> which<br />

scientific knowledge <strong>in</strong>fluences <strong>the</strong> a priori conceptual<br />

scheme is a large question, that cannot be analysed here.<br />

But this work is needed, because if <strong>the</strong> conceptual <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

empirical are orthogonal <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way that B&H claim, <strong>the</strong>n<br />

<strong>the</strong>re is noth<strong>in</strong>g fur<strong>the</strong>r to be said about <strong>the</strong> ontology of<br />

m<strong>in</strong>d: enquiry is brought to a close by <strong>the</strong>ir strictures.<br />

Do Bra<strong>in</strong>s Th<strong>in</strong>k? — Christopher Humphries<br />

Literature<br />

ARISTOTLE 1986 De Anima, tr. Lawson-Tancred, H., London: Pengu<strong>in</strong><br />

Books.<br />

BENNETT, MAXWELL, DENNETT, DANIEL, HACKER, PETER AND SEARLE,<br />

JOHN 2007 Neuroscience <strong>and</strong> <strong>Philosophy</strong>: Body, M<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> Language,<br />

New York: Columbia University Press.<br />

BENNETT, M.R. AND HACKER, P.M.S. 2003 Philosophical Foundations<br />

of Neuroscience, London: Blackwell.<br />

DENNETT, DANIEL 2007 “<strong>Philosophy</strong> as Naïve Anthropology: Comment<br />

on Bennett <strong>and</strong> Hacker” <strong>in</strong>: Bennett et al. 2007.<br />

GLOCK, HANS-JOHANN 1996, A Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> Dictionary, London:<br />

Blackwell.<br />

HACKER, P.M.S. 2007 Human Nature: The Categorical Perspective,<br />

London: Blackwell.<br />

HACKER, P.M.S. 1990 Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>: Mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>d, London:<br />

Blackwell.<br />

QUINE, WILLARD VAN ORMAN 1961, “Two dogmas of empiricism”, <strong>in</strong><br />

From a Logical Po<strong>in</strong>t of View: N<strong>in</strong>e Logico-Philosophical Essays,<br />

2 nd ed., Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.<br />

SEARLE, JOHN 2007 “Putt<strong>in</strong>g Consciousness Back <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bra<strong>in</strong>:<br />

Reply to Bennett <strong>and</strong> Hacker” <strong>in</strong>: Bennett et al. 2007.<br />

SEARLE, JOHN 1992 The Rediscovery of <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>d, Cambridge Mass:<br />

The MIT Press.<br />

STRAWSON, PETER 1957 Individuals: An Essay <strong>in</strong> Descriptive Metaphysics,<br />

London: Routledge.<br />

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG 2001 Philosophical Investigations, tr.<br />

Anscombe, G.E.M., London: Blackwell.<br />

149

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!