Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

An initial worry with this line of thought is that it
seems to express a sort of “mysterianism” about physical
reducer properties. What is needed at this point is a
principled account of just what subset of the powers of a
physical realizer property we are interested in and whether
it is plausible to regard these powers as determining a
physical property insofar as they determine any property at
all. One nonarbitrary possibility is that the powers in
question will be those shared by all of the realizers of a
given realized property. The question is then whether we
should hold that these powers determine a physical
property insofar as they determine any property. While I
will not attempt to answer this question here, it should be
noted that the worry here under consideration does not
threaten the minimal claim that given that the subset view
does not entail the falsity of R1, it does not entail the
failure of conservative reductionism.
6. Conclusion
For these reasons, then, it seems that the subset view does
not mandate the rejection of reductionism about functional,
realized properties. First, the reductionist can insist on
causal inheritance, and so reject the first premise in Shoemaker’s
argument. Second, the reductionist can appeal to
nonconservative reductionism about such properties. Finally,
the reductionist can contend that without an additional premise,
the subset view does not entail the failure of conservative
reductionism about realized properties.
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Functional Reduction and the Subset View of Realization — Kevin Morris
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