Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

Four Anti-reductionist Dogmas in the Light of Biophysical Micro-reduction of Mind & Body — Theo A. F. Kuipers
applications, the transformation step consists of replacing
realization-type attributions by macro-type attributions. I
call this reduction of a law of the first degree, or quasireduction.
If two MB-types are one-many type-type
reducible and lawfully connected, there must be a lawful
connection of unions of CS-types. Formally, this must even
be the case in such a way that the first can be reduced to
the second, in the sense of reduction by identification,
based on the appropriate multiple Type-Type Identity
Hypotheses (SiS, Chapter 5). I call this reduction of a law
of the second degree, or multiple reduction of a law. In the
special case that MB-types can be reduced to proper CStypes,
the law reduction is a result of the third degree,
called singular or strong reduction of a law.
I have mainly restricted myself to the general
perspective; for the specifications for the causal-structural,
functional and intentional style I refer to SiS, Chapter 6.3.
Paradigmatic examples of research that show progress in
realizing the above described micro-reductionist ambitions
concern learning and memory (Kandel et al., 2000;
Kandel, 2006, Huisman, 2005). Moreover, other examples
seem to fit very well. In SiS, Chapter 6.3, upon which the
core of this paper heavily draws, indications are given to
research dealing with mental disorders and 6.4 deals,
more extensively, with juvenile delinquency, essentially
illustrating the non-validity of the four anti-reductionist
dogmas.
Conclusion
All discussed degrees of micro-reduction of concepts and
laws concern straightforward non-eliminative reduction.
Multiple reduction of concepts and laws exploits the possibilities
of multiple realizability instead of being blocked by
it. Many of the reduced concepts and laws will typically
represent supervient properties and patterns, in particular
arising from the interaction of micro-entities. Finally, wherever
relevant, the micro-state goes beyond the neural
state and includes the relevant parts and aspects of the
(rest of) body and of the environment. Hence, none of the
four anti-reductionist dogmas is observed by what I like to
call biophysical micro-reduction of mind&body.
Acknowledgement
I like to thank Fred Keijzer for his critical comments on a
draft.
Literature
Huisman, L. 2005 Neuroscientific reduction: Functional versus
Phenomenal Aspects of the Mind, MA-thesis, Groningen: Faculty
of Philosophy.
Kandel, E. 2006 In search of memory, New York: W.W. Norton&Cy.
Kandel, E., Schwartz, J.H., Jessel, T. M. 2000 Principles of Neural
Science: International Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Companies.
Kuipers, T. 2001 Structures in Science (SiS), Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Schwartz, J. 1991 "Reduction, elimination, and the mental", Philosophy
of Science, 58, 203-220.
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