Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

In conclusion, Quine has two reduction methods for meanings.
The first, interpreting empirical meaning as stimulus
meaning has limited applicability. In the second method,
meanings are regarded as sets of synonymous expressions,
whereby synonymy is characterised through analyticity,
which is in a behaviourist way explained as true as a
result of learning the language. This could be explained as
resulting from socially imposed semantical rules, but Quine
refrains from taking this last step. It is as if only his aversion
of transforming the natural language prevents him
from taking it.
66
Quine on the Reduction of Meanings — Lieven Decock
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