Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

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Mental Causation: A Lesson from Action Theory Markus Schlosser, Bristol, England, UK 1. What is Mental Causation? Approaching an answer to this question, let us first assume that the kind of causation we are interested in is eventcausation, where events may be construed as particulars or instantiations of properties. Given that, there is mental causation only if some mental events are causally efficacious in the sense that they stand in event-causal relations with other events. Most philosophers would add, firstly, that mental events must be causally efficacious in virtue of their mental properties (in virtue of instantiating mental properties), and secondly, that they must not overdetermine their effects. There is widespread agreement on this, and I will take it for granted here. The question I am interested in is this: What kinds of things must mental events cause for there to be genuine mental causation? The contemporary mental causation debate, it is sometimes claimed, has its roots in Donald Davidson’s seminal paper “Mental Events” (1970). One of the basic assumptions in this paper says that there is interaction between mental and physical events: some physical events cause mental events and some mental events cause physical events. Damage to muscle tissue, for instance, can cause pain, and intentions can cause behaviour. Many philosophers would agree with Davidson on this. They would agree, in particular, that mental causation requires mental-to-physical causation. Many philosophers, however, would also acknowledge that the mental could be causally efficacious by causing other mental events. So why insist on interaction with physical events, if we could have mental causation within the domain of the mental alone? We can identify two closely related reasons for the insistence on mental-to-physical causation. Firstly, if there is mental-tomental causation, then the mental is causally efficacious, strictly speaking. Nevertheless, this falls short of genuine mental causation. We tend to think that the mental is truly efficacious only if it causes physical events: mental events make a real difference only if they make a difference in the physical world. Secondly, genuine mental causation requires that mental events make a difference to our behaviour. They must, that is, make a difference to our bodily movements. (Some might reject the suggestion that mental-to-mental causation amounts to mental causation on the ground that we cannot rule out epiphenomenalism, if the mental has no observable effects.) 2. A Dilemma for Non-Reductive Physicalism In the following I will sketch a version of non-reductive physicalism, and I will defend it against an influential objection. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that psychology is irreducible and that some version of physicalism is true. As just pointed out, many philosophers think that there is genuine mental causation only if some mental events have physical effects. But mental-to-physical causation leads to a well-known problem for non-reductive physicalism: if mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects, given the causal closure of the physical. Given all that, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects, and if they cause only other mental events, they are not truly efficacious. So either way, the efficacy of the mental falls short of genuine mental causation. This dilemma is based on the dichotomy between mental-to-physical and mental-to-mental causation. I will now argue that this is a false dichotomy. 3. Actions and Movements The dichotomy between mental-to-physical and mental-tomental causation can be avoided if one acknowledges the distinction between actions and bodily movements. This distinction is common within the philosophy of action. In the philosophy of mind, however, it is neglected, sometimes overlooked and often blurred by talk about behaviour. Given that behaviour is the most important effect of mental events, this distinction should be of interest, and I will suggest that it can help in dealing with the problem of mental causation. There is genuine mental causation if mental events cause and causally explain actions (in virtue of their mental properties and without overdetermination). But actions, I submit, are neither mental nor physical events. If that is correct, then there can be genuine mental causation without mental-to-physical causation and without limitation to mental-to-mental causation. Most philosophers of mind accept or presuppose, implicitly perhaps, an event-causal theory of action. According to this view, actions are events with a certain causal history. Certain events, that is, are actions in virtue of being caused by the right antecedents (in the right way). The right antecedents are mental events that rationalize the action: an event is an action only if it is caused by rationalizing mental events and in virtue of being caused in that way. The causal history, in other words, is part of an action’s essence or identity. Some actions, I take it, are mental actions. On the causal theory, mental actions are realized by and perhaps token-identical to mental events. But they are not typeidentical with mental events, because being of a certain mental event-type does not determine whether or not the event is an action. The formation of an intention, for instance, may be an action or not (we form some intentions actively, others passively). Whether it is an action or not depends on its causal history. The same holds for so-called overt actions (roughly, actions that involve bodily movement). Take a standard example of a basic action such as raising one’s arm. It is physically realized by an arm rising, and perhaps every particular arm raising is token-identical with a particular arm rising. But they are not type-identical for the reasons given. Not every arm rising is an arm raising: being a certain type of movement does not determine whether or not the event is an action. What is the rationale behind thinking of actions in historical or etiological terms? Consider the following two widely accepted doctrines. Firstly, all actions are intentional (under some description). Secondly, an action is intentional insofar as it is done for reasons in the 301
minimal sense that it can be rationalized in light of some of the agent’s mental events, and it is an action in virtue of being done for reasons in this sense. Proponents of the causal theory have argued that an action is done for reasons only if it is caused and causally explained by the mental events that rationalize it. Hence, the causal history enters into the essence of actions. A further reason for thinking that actions are not type-identical with the physical events that realize them is given by the fact that most of our non-basic actions are multiply realizable. Assume that I give someone a signal by raising my arm. In this case, I perform the non-basic action of giving a signal by raising my arm. Clearly, there are many different ways in which I can give someone a signal. The act-type of giving a signal is in this sense multiply realizable and therefore not identical with a certain type of movement. So, on the view that I am suggesting, actions are caused and causally explained by mental events. Both mental events and actions are realized by physical events. Given the irreducibility of the mental, mental events are not type-identical with physical events. And given the etiological nature of action, actions are not type-identical with physical events either. In particular, overt actions are not type-identical with bodily movements (although they are realized by them). Given further that mental events cause actions in virtue of their mental properties, we obtain a view according to which the mental is causally efficacious in a way that avoids the mentioned dichotomy. Mental events cause actions in virtue of their mental properties and without overdetermination. But this is neither mental-to-physical nor merely mental-to-mental causation. In the next section I will address a pressing objection, rather than developing the view further. Consider, though, some brief remarks concerning the interaction between mind and body. On my view, mental causation is not merely mental-to-mental, because mental events cause actions. Actions, I argued, are neither mental nor physical events. What are they? They are realized by physical events, but they belong to the domain or level of psychological and intentional explanation: we recognize them as actions only insofar as they are rationalized in the light of mental events. What about the other direction? Is pain, for instance, caused by physical events? This appears to be undeniable. But consider the following alternative. It is not implausible to suggest that damage to muscle tissue, for instance, causes certain physical events in the brain that realize the mental event of pain. On this view, no physical event causes pain. Rather, physical events cause other physical events, which realize pain. If something like this holds for all mental events, and if my view on mental causation is correct, then there is no causal interaction between the mental and the physical. Nevertheless, epiphenomalism is false as mental events cause actions. 4. Overdetermination and Downward Causation One apparent advantage of the suggested non-reductive view is that it avoids the causal exclusion problem. Mental events do not cause physical events, hence there is no problem of causal overdetermination and exclusion. But it has been argued, most prominently by Jaegwon Kim, that non-reductive physicalism is committed to downward causation. Kim argues for this claim by considering mental-to- 302 Mental Causation: A Lesson from Action Theory — Markus Schlosser mental causation. Assume that the mental event M causes another mental event M*. According to any version of nonreductive physicalism, M and M* are realized by physical events (their supervenience base). Assume that P is the supervenience base of M, and that P* is the supervenience base of M*. What explains the occurrence of M*? There are two candidates: the occurrence of M and the occurrence of P*. Both explain the occurrence of M*, and together they overdetermine M*, albeit not causally. M determines M* in virtue of being its cause, and P* determines M* in virtue of being its supervenience base. This creates a prima facie tension between the two explanations. The best way to resolve this tension, Kim argues, is to assume that M causes M* by causing its supervenience base P*. This shows, according to Kim, that mental-tomental causation presupposes mental-to-physical causation (2005, 39-40). It would seem obvious that the same reasoning can be applied to the view that I have suggested. If actions are caused by mental events, and if they are realized by physical events, then the resulting tension and overdetermination requires us to assume downward causation: we must assume that mental events cause the physical events (bodily movements, for instance), which realize actions. But this line of reasoning is mistaken. According to Kim, the occurrence of the supervenience base of a certain mental event realizes, determines and necessitates the occurrence of the mental event. So, in the example, the occurrence of P* determines and necessitates the occurrence of M*. P* by itself necessitates M*, as Kim says, “no matter what happened before” (39), in particular, no matter whether M occurred or not (unless M is a cause of P*). Putting aside the question of whether non-reductive physicalism is in fact committed to this, the same does not hold for actions. Actions, we assume, are realized by physical events. It may well be that there is a sense in which physical events determine actions (in the sense in which determinates determine determinables, perhaps). But the occurrence of a certain bodily movement, for instance, does not necessitate the occurrence of a certain type of action, for the reasons given above. A certain physical event, such as a certain bodily movement, realizes an action only if it has the right causal history. Let us replace the mental event M* in the example by an action A. Given the assumptions, A is caused by M and realized by P*. But given the introduced claims concerning the nature of action, it is not true that the occurrence of P* necessitates the occurrence of an A-ing. Whether or not P* realizes an A-ing depends on the causal history. Given that an action has been performed, we can assume that M is a rationalizing cause of A. Had there been no rationalizing cause, there would have been no action performed (P* would not have realized an A-ing). So, in this particular case, whether an A-ing is performed or not depends on whether or not M occurred and on whether or not M causes the A-ing. Hence, P* alone does not necessitate the occurrence of an A-ing. One might reply that it is perhaps not P* alone that necessitates P, but P*’s being caused by P. Assuming that P realizes the mental event M, P’s causing P* realizes the causal history that makes P* an action. In that way, the occurrence of A is necessitated by the occurrence of physical events and physical causation, and the problem of overdetermination reappears: M merely overdetermines A, as A is determined by P’s causing P*.
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31 Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb H
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Reduktion und Elimination in Philos
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Distributors Die Österreichische L
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6 Inhalt / Contents Wittgenstein me
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8 Inhalt / Contents The Evolution o
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Formal Mechanisms for Reduction in
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4. Property language and theoretica
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imperatives, or commands in the for
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Referential Practice and the Lure o
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The Augustinian account confuses mo
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hurried to fix it on the page. The
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The Essence (?) of Color, According
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Literature Austin, James 1980 “Wi
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Wittgenstein’s Externalism - Gett
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Informal Reduction E.P. Brandon, Ca
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An Anti-Reductionist Argument Based
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An Anti-Reductionist Argument Based
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Did I Do It? -Yeah, You Did! Wittge
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Literature Did I Do It? -Yeah, You
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tween the two approaches. The task
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On Two Recent Defenses of The Simpl
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On Two Recent Defenses of The Simpl
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Queen Victoria’s Dying Thoughts T
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Diagonalization. The Liar Paradox,
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Proof: Given a function ƒ from con
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that I am sure that it is true that
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experiencing something as a red pen
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There can be Causal without Ontolog
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There can be Causal without Ontolog
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objects. But they also leave unansw
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The Knower Paradox and the Quantifi
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The Knower Paradox and the Quantifi
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lent. It also implies that an inven
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The Scapegoat Theory of Causality M
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We may have evolved a specialized c
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easoning have their source in the l
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Wittgenstein on Frazer and Explanat
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genstein 1993, p. 143). In order to
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an adequate syntactic analysis of o
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Wittgenstein meets ÖGS: Wovon man
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Wittgenstein meets ÖGS: Wovon man
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3. Der Elementarsatz wird als Relat
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Literatur Glock, Hans Johann 2006
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Explaining the Brain: Ruthless Redu
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Occam’s Razor in the Theory of Th
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Literature Campbell, Donald T. 1987
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Die Nichtreduzierbarkeit der klassi
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Literatur Die Nichtreduzierbarkeit
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Let T I be the minimal theory of tr
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Does Bradley’s Regress Support No
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(3) Mutatis mutandis, realism has t
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Zeitliche Ontologie und zeitliche R
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Betrachtung ontologischer Fragen, M
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The decisive consequences of this a
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Benacerraf and Bad Company (An Atta
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offer a solution to the bad company
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Literature Benacerraf, Paul 1965
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"PA" by using "PA* ", at least at t
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Hard Naturalism and its Puzzles Ren
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The Mind-Body-Problem and Score-Kee
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mental properties, for instance, or
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kommt es zu einem gravierenden Miss
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Reduction Revisited: The Ontologica
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4. Conclusion Reduction Revisited:
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All in all, we have seen that reduc
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Physicalism Without the A Priori Pa
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Literature Cartwright, Nancy 1999:
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Wittgensteins Projektionsmethode al
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Schlussbemerkungen Wittgensteins Pr
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intentional states requires functio
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Relating Theories. Models and Struc
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Literature Relating Theories. Model
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e invoked in response to the questi
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Do Brains Think? Christopher Humphr
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4. Conclusion So do brains think or
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How Metaphors Alter the World-Pictu
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The Modal Supervenience of the Conc
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Literature van der Auwera, Johan an
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3. The Determination of Form by Syn
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Zwischen Humes Gesetz und „Sollen
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Zwischen Humes Gesetz und „Sollen
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Assessing Humean Supervenience Amir
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determination thesis; it fails as a
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Aus der obigen Definition folgt, da
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Ding-Ontology of Aristotle vs. Sach
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Ding-Ontology of Aristotle vs. Sach
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How do Moral Principles Figure in M
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“Downward Causation”: Emergent,
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“Downward Causation”: Emergent,
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A with distinguished subset Z of te
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A Metaphysically Moderate Version o
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Literature Balashov, Yuri 2002 ''Wh
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“In der Frage liegt ein Fehler”
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Problems with Psychophysical Identi
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identity theory, or as a predecesso
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of the world. It only matters that
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Four Anti-reductionist Dogmas in th
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Four Anti-reductionist Dogmas in th
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notion of time and requires that so
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Some Remarks on Wittgenstein and Ty
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Some Remarks on Wittgenstein and Ty
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concrete particulars can be subject
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phenomenal concept of experiencing
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Metaphorische Bedeutung als virtus
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speaker is then attaching a special
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„Vom Weißdorn und vom Propheten
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„Die Einheit hören“ - Einige
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„Die Einheit hören“ - Einige
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S4) the necessity of arithmetic is
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Getting out from Inside: Why the Cl
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Dispensing with Particulars: Unders
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Literature Dispensing with Particul
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Reichenbach’s Concept of Logical
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Defining Ontological Naturalism Mar
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Literature Jackson, Frank 1986. “
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properties are located. This proces
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‘our conceptual scheme’ “is c
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Properties and Reduction between Me
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Does this mean that metaphysics sho
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do not pick out pain in a system by
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The Writing of Nietzsche and Wittge
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his teachings. He coincides with hi
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sense of a proposition without firs
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Naturalistic Ethics: A Logical Posi
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Literature Kant, Immanuel 2006 Crit
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Page 260 and 261: The Key Problems of KC Matteo Pleba
Page 262 and 263: have embraced the myth of prose: it
Page 264 and 265: 5. Prior’s Problem As Patrick Bla
Page 266 and 267: Reductionism in Axiology: the Case
Page 268 and 269: developing of cancer tissue in huma
Page 270 and 271: (2) One-way Nagelian bridge princip
Page 272 and 273: Rethinking the Modal Argument again
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Page 276 and 277: that we are to find the features we
Page 278 and 279: Atypical Rational Agency Paul Raymo
Page 280 and 281: Literature Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957
Page 282 and 283: situation bieten sich keine Kriteri
Page 284 and 285: Two Reductions of ‘rule’ Dana R
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Page 290 and 291: Wittgenstein’s Attitudes Fabien S
Page 292 and 293: view of logic, in accordance with h
Page 294 and 295: Warum man auf transzendentalphiloso
Page 296 and 297: Making the Mind Higher-Level Elizab
Page 298 and 299: Literature Churchland, P. M. (1995)
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Page 304 and 305: Again, this is mistaken. Non-reduct
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Page 308 and 309: Reduction, Sets, and Properties Ben
Page 310 and 311: Literature Egan, Andy (2004): ‘Se
Page 312 and 313: there is a tension between evaluati
Page 314 and 315: The Elimination of Meaning in Compu
Page 316 and 317: sufficient to explain all of the em
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Page 320 and 321: the necktie sense) can differ in wh
Page 322 and 323: Supervenience and ‘Should’ Arto
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Page 326 and 327: Rule-following as Coordination: A G
Page 328 and 329: vast majority are bent: gruesome, g
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Page 332 and 333: A Division in Mind. The Misconceive
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Page 336 and 337: could then deduce (1c) and conclude
Page 338 and 339: Neutral Monism. A Miraculous, Incoh
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Page 342 and 343: A somewhat Eliminativist Proposal a
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that he was working on a translatio
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Objects of Perception, Objects of S
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Objects of Perception, Objects of S
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Let us take the example of the hypo
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Reducing Sets to Modalities Rafał
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variables ai that (under an interpr
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Are Lamarckian Explanations Fully R
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A Note on Tractatus 5.521 Nuno Vent
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And he goes on saying, referring to
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The Place of Theory Reduction in th
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Ethik als irreduzibles Supervenienz
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unabhängig von denen ihrer Mitglie
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Das ‘schwierige Problem’ des Be
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The Supervenience Argument, Levels,
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The Supervenience Argument, Levels,
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their relations both to the physica
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On the Characterization of Objects
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On the Characterization of Objects
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The Functional Unity of Special Sci
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size, location, temporal characteri
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Transcendental Philosophy and Mind-
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From Topology to Logic. The Neural
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From Topology to Logic. The Neural
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The Calculus of Inductive Construct
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The Four-Color Theorem, Testimony a
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experience. Of course, a detailed a
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Clearly x = y → x = ext y holds,
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Intentional Fundamentalism Petri Yl
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The second dimension to be consider
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The very existence of the special s
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Heil, J. (1999), “Multiple Realiz
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independent of what is the fact, fa
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415
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Publications of the Austrian Ludwig
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