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Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

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properties are located. This process transforms a sense<br />

proposition until it says noth<strong>in</strong>g but it shows its logical<br />

form.<br />

The method could be represented as <strong>in</strong> Figure 1.<br />

Please notice that <strong>the</strong> generalization process it’s<br />

much more subtle than how it seems. Especially <strong>the</strong> 3 th<br />

generalization step it’s critical, because assum<strong>in</strong>g a<br />

general sensorial space, it’s not enough to derive a logical<br />

form from <strong>the</strong> propositions obta<strong>in</strong>ed from <strong>the</strong> 2 nd<br />

generalization: also <strong>the</strong> sensorial properties expressions<br />

(<strong>in</strong> Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s use of <strong>the</strong> term ‘expression’, see aga<strong>in</strong><br />

propositions 3.311-3.313) must be considered ak<strong>in</strong> a priori.<br />

This is actually not guaranteed by <strong>the</strong> sensorial space<br />

structure.<br />

The process applied to write <strong>the</strong> logical form of <strong>the</strong> sensorial propositions<br />

At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> generalization process, at <strong>the</strong> level of <strong>the</strong><br />

logical form, <strong>the</strong> sensorial space structure is still <strong>in</strong> evidence.<br />

The critical po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>the</strong> whole process is once<br />

aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> assumption of <strong>the</strong> structure of <strong>the</strong> sensorial<br />

spaces (derived from 6.3751) as a logic place where it is<br />

possible, def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “position” of an object, to negate <strong>the</strong><br />

rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g space for <strong>the</strong> same object.<br />

4. The Contradiction<br />

Because of <strong>the</strong> dependency between a sense proposition<br />

‘Ra’ <strong>and</strong> all <strong>the</strong> propositions about ‘a’ related through that<br />

space properties, <strong>the</strong> strange “exclusion” <strong>in</strong> Table 1 is not<br />

more needed. If ‘a is red’ is ‘Ra’ <strong>and</strong> ‘a is green’ is ‘Ga’, <strong>the</strong><br />

logical product became:<br />

It is always possible to write 2 :<br />

because S S R G ∈ <strong>and</strong> RS ∈ GS<br />

( RSa ∧ GSa)<br />

∧ ~ ( RSa<br />

∧ GSa)<br />

( a ∧ G a)<br />

∧ ~ ( G a ∧ R a)<br />

RS S S S<br />

.<br />

2 In a slightly generalized sense, RS <strong>and</strong> GS <strong>in</strong>dicates here <strong>the</strong> classes of<br />

<strong>the</strong> properties different from R <strong>and</strong> G <strong>in</strong> space S.<br />

The Logic of Sensorial Propositions — Luca Modenese<br />

With this method we f<strong>in</strong>ally obta<strong>in</strong> a genu<strong>in</strong>e contradiction<br />

<strong>and</strong> also <strong>the</strong> first l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> Table 1 is clearly managed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

difficulty by it generated resolved: <strong>the</strong> first l<strong>in</strong>e must be<br />

considered valid <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same way as <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> its apparent<br />

absurdity is resolved thanks to <strong>the</strong> second “hidden”<br />

term discovered by <strong>the</strong> analysis of <strong>the</strong> sensorial propositions.<br />

A consequence of sensorial propositions logical<br />

form is that a logic product between propositions of <strong>the</strong><br />

same sensorial space can be only a contradiction or a<br />

tautology (consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> same space-temporal<br />

coord<strong>in</strong>ate of course). The logic product of propositions<br />

belong<strong>in</strong>g to different spaces <strong>in</strong>stead is never nei<strong>the</strong>r a<br />

contradiction nor a tautology.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>vestigation here presented can be considered<br />

an example of <strong>the</strong> clarify<strong>in</strong>g possibilities of logical analysis.<br />

5. Conclusion<br />

The method described <strong>in</strong> proposition 3.315 of <strong>the</strong> Tractatus<br />

was used to clarify <strong>the</strong> nature of sensorial propositions,<br />

after <strong>the</strong> assumption for all <strong>the</strong> sensorial spaces of<br />

<strong>the</strong> logic structure of colours presented <strong>in</strong> proposition<br />

6.3751. Consider<strong>in</strong>g sensorial spaces that are fully <strong>in</strong>volved<br />

when a s<strong>in</strong>gle po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>the</strong>m is used to def<strong>in</strong>e an<br />

object, it is shown how truth tables derived from sensorial<br />

propositions can be expressed <strong>in</strong> a complete <strong>and</strong> clear<br />

way, useful to <strong>in</strong>vestigate <strong>the</strong>ir logical properties.<br />

The assumptions <strong>and</strong> critical po<strong>in</strong>ts of <strong>the</strong> process<br />

developed have been stressed <strong>in</strong> a way so that anyone<br />

could decide by himself if accept or refuse such a way of<br />

proceed<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Literature<br />

Anscombe, Gertrude E. M. 1959 An <strong>in</strong>troduction to Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s<br />

Tractatus, London: Hutch<strong>in</strong>son&Co.<br />

Kenny, Anthony J. P. 1973 Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, London: Allen Lane The<br />

Pengu<strong>in</strong> Press.<br />

Ramsey, Frank P. 1923 Critical notice of L. Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s Tractatus<br />

Logico-Philosophicus, M<strong>in</strong>d, XXXII, 128, 465-478.<br />

Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, L. 1984 Tractatus logico-philosophicus, <strong>in</strong>: Werkausgabe<br />

<strong>in</strong> 8 Baenden, B<strong>and</strong> 1, Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Suhrkamp.<br />

Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, L. 1929 Some Remarks on Logical Form, Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian Society Suppl. vol. 9 162-171.<br />

231

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