Download the file - United Nations Rule of Law

Urban crime and violence: Conditions and trends71opening of new economic frontiers, and pressures broughtto bear on developing nations to cut back bureaucracieswhile increasing private-sector involvement in state enterprises.175 The resulting destabilization has led to widespreadjob insecurity and increasing social fragmentation amongyoung people, especially those living in distressed communitiesin developed and developing nations. Gang membershipthereby provides alternative avenues relating to illiciteconomic gains from robbery, extortion and other types ofcrime, with violence being used as a resource to obtain socialidentity. 176 Although there is variability among regions andnations, this overall trend is not likely to be reversed in theforeseeable future.■ Deportation of offending criminalsClosely related to globalization is the deportation of criminalsto their countries of origin. This phenomenon, which isquite common in Latin America and the Caribbean, whereoffenders are deported from the US, in part accounts forincreasing levels of youth crime and gang-related activities inthe region. In Central America, the phenomenal growth inyouth gangs has been attributed to the deportation of youngSalvadorans from the US. This has resulted in the ‘transfer’of gang wars from the ghettos of Los Angeles to the streetsof El Salvador. 177 Similarly, in Jamaica, where gangs have astranglehold on society and are at the centre of mostmurders, the feeling is rife that deportees are a major part ofthe crime problem. Indeed, the deportation of criminals hasbeen linked to escalating gang violence, extortion and drugrelatedmurders experienced over the past five years. 178 In2001, ‘an analysis by the Jamaican police concluded thatdeportees, many of them gang members from the northeasternUS, were involved in 600 murders, 1700 armedrobberies and 150 shoot-outs with police’. 179 The effect ofdeportees on the Jamaican crime scene is further highlightedin a survey of deported criminals, which revealed that 53 percent had been involved in criminal activities since deportation.180 Such crimes include those not reported to thepolice. Among those reporting involvement in crime, 78 percent had committed more than one crime, and another 35per cent indicated that they had been involved in drugrelatedoffences.Transition towards democratizationAs violent crime rates have variably increased over the pasthalf century, cross-national, longitudinal research paints apicture of this as an outcome, at least in part, of broadinternational trends in governance. In this context,homicide rates are used as an indicator of violent crime.Reporting on observed trends in 44 mostly industrializedcountries over a 50-year period, research indicates thatglobal homicide rates have grown at about the same time asthere have been significant increases in political democratization.181 Evidence to support this contention comes fromresearchers tracking significantly increased homicides inLatin America following widespread democratization of theregion during the 1990s. Democratization is broadlycharacterized as the spread of governments that are putEl SalvadorBrazilBahamasUnited StatesThailandGeorgiaIsraelBelgiumEstoniaSerbia and MontenegroPortugalCroatiaCanadaBahrainKuwait0 25 50 75 100into power by majority vote and supported by civil societiesthat ‘encourage citizen participation, public deliberationand civic education’. 182 Three principal theories have beenelaborated upon in this context. They are the ‘civilizationperspective’, the ‘conflict perspective’ and the ‘modernizationperspective’. Figure 3.21 summarizes the expectedrelationships between democracy and crime based on thesetheories.Results of statistical analysis suggest that nationsundergoing transition from autocratic governance to democracyexhibit the most significant increases in homicide rates(modernization perspective). These include countries inEastern Europe and the Latin America and Caribbean region.As such nations move towards full democracy, their ratesmay begin to decline, even though they will not disappearand may, indeed, creep upward as evidenced by the datafrom full democracies. Evidence to support the decline inrates commensurate with democratization may be found inSouth Africa’s murder rates, which have been declining as ithas been consolidating democratic governance. In 1995, itsmurder rate was 68 per 100,000 individuals, which dippedto 50 per 100,000 and then 48 per 100,000 in 2002. During2003 to 2004, the rate dropped to 44 per 100,000 – stillextremely high, but an impressive 35 per cent improvementin less than a decade. Other evidence comes from the reductionof the murder rate in Diadema (Brazil), which has slowlyconsolidated a democratic response to crime as it hasevolved from a community based on frontier justicestandards. Although still high, its murder rate has fallentwice as fast as that of neighbouring São Paulo’s between1999 and 2003. 183 It should be noted that the latter trendsare short term and may not be indicative of causal relationships.Indeed, there are democratic states where violencerates are extremely high, such as Colombia and Jamaica.OverallMen aged 15–29Figure 3.20Firearm homiciderates: Victims per100,000 individualsamong men aged 15 to19 compared with theoverall population(selected countries,latest year available)Source: Small Arms Survey,2006a, p297In Central America,the phenomenalgrowth in youthgangs has beenattributed to thedeportation of youngSalvadorans fromthe US