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Enhancing tenure security and ending forced evictions277Zimbabwe are indicative of this trend, as she recommendsthat the government ‘should hold to account those responsiblefor the injury caused by the operation’ (see Box 5.14).A global moratorium on forced evictionsExamples the world over have shown that forced evictionsare not an inevitable consequence of economic development,nor are they the necessary price of progress or anadjunct to civic infrastructure improvements. Forcedevictions are a largely preventable source of inconceivablehuman anguish. While some evictions may be impossible toavoid (under exceptional circumstances), the overwhelmingmajority of the forced evictions already carried out and thosethat are planned can be prevented and ultimately madeunnecessary. An initial global moratorium on forcedevictions, therefore, over a period of five years could be oneconcrete means for ending a practice that patently violates arange of recognized human rights.United Nations member states could proclaim such amoratorium at a future United Nations General Assemblysession. During the five-year moratorium period, each statewould cease carrying out forced evictions, review domesticlegislation on these practices, carry out any legislativereform required to adequately protect people against forcedeviction, all the while taking a series of well-financed andconcerted series of steps to confer security of tenure on allof the world’s communities currently without such protections.This initial five-year period would see national securityof tenure action plans developed in all member states. Suchplans could be coordinated by initiatives such as the GlobalCampaign for Secure Tenure and would involve morepositive and suitable approaches to security of tenure emerging,combined with renewed commitments and resourcesdedicated to the improvement of existing homes andcommunities.NOTESA global mechanism to monitor therealization of housing rightsAs noted in Chapter 6, there is a glaring lack of accurate andcomprehensive data on security of tenure and forcedevictions. Similarly, there is also a scarcity of data on othercomponents of the right to adequate housing. This is sodespite the fact that all state parties to the ICESCR arerequired, by international law, to submit such data to theCESCR every five years (see Box 5.4). Several differentefforts are already under way to collect such data, includingas part of the effort to report on the implementation of theMDG on improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by2020. Yet, it is time for the establishment of a mechanism tocollect a comprehensive set of data on the progressiverealization of HLP rights. The effort to design and implementa set of housing rights indicators by the United NationsHousing Rights Programme (see Box 5.5) is an importantstep in this direction since it gives advocates and governmentsalike information needed to establish benchmarks,evaluate success (and failure) and implement effectivepolicies.Perhaps the time for addressing this in a morecompressive manner has arrived, with the ongoing reform ofthe human rights framework and mechanisms within theUnited Nations system, including that of treaty bodies, ingeneral, and the reporting procedure, in particular. It hasbeen argued that use of appropriate indicators for assessinghuman rights implementation could contribute to streamliningthe reporting process, make it more transparent andeffective, reduce the reporting burden, and, above all,improve follow-up on the recommendations and concludingobservations of the CESCR at the national level. The ongoingwork of the United Nations Housing Rights Programmeregarding the development of housing rights indicators is agood start and should be supported, particularly in thecontext of developing a comprehensive mechanism forcontinuous monitoring of the progressive realization of allhuman rights.A global moratoriumon forced evictions… could be oneconcrete means forending a practicethat … violates arange of … humanrightsIt is time for theestablishment of amechanism tocollect a comprehensiveset of data onthe progressiverealization of HLPrights1 See, for instance, COHRE,2006.2 See CESCR, GeneralComment No 15.3 UN-Habitat, 2004b.4 ICESCR, Article 11(1).5 CESCR, General CommentNo 4, para 8. For an indepthanalysis of the right toadequate housing, see UN-Habitat and OHCHR, 2002.6 CESCR, General CommentNo 4.7 Ibid, para 11.8 ICESCR, Article 2(1).9 Commission on HumanRights, Resolution 1993/77.10 Commission on HumanRights, Resolution 2004/28.11 UN DocumentE/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2,Principle 6.12 CESCR, General CommentNo 7, para 18. See also UN-Habitat and OHCHR, 2002.13 See United Nations HumanRights Committee, GeneralComment No 27, para 7.14 Approved in 2005 by theUnited Nations Sub-Commission on theProtection and Promotionof Human Rights. See alsoFAO et al (2007) for practicalways of implementingthe Pinheiro Principles.15 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, Article 17.16 Schabas, 1991.17 CESCR, General CommentNo 4, para 7.18 Buyse, 2006.19 See Leckie (2003b), whichprovides an overview ofmore than 12 restitutioninitiatives.20 UN DocumentsE/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17,Principle 2.1. Additionalrelevant provisions can befound throughout Principles2 and 10.21 Williams, 2006, p173.22 Leckie, 2005a.23 World Bank, 2003b, p186.24 Payne, 2001b, p8.25 Payne, 2005.26 UNCHS and ILO, 1995.27 Payne, 2002.28 A favela is an informalsettlement, normally foundin the periphery of the city.In contrast, cortiços areoverpopulated high rises.29 Payne, 2005.30 United Nations, 2005.31 Payne and Majale, 2004.32 1998 Maastricht Guidelineson Violations of Economic,Social and Cultural Rights.33 Karapuu and Rosas, 1990(Act No 380/1987, Article8(2) and Child Welfare ActNo 683/1983, respectively).34 1994 German FederalWelfare Assistance Act,sections 15(a) and 72,respectively.35 CESCR, General CommentNo 7, para 16.36 Ibid, para 14.37 International Council onHuman Rights Policy, 2005.38 Ibid.39 Durand-Lasserve, 1998,p242.40 See www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle1.html.41 See www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9013904&contentId=7026915.42 Clapham, 2006.43 Ibid, p222.44 See, for example, Article 49of the Geneva ConventionRelative to the Protection ofCivilian Persons in Time ofWar, and Article 17 ofProtocol II to the GenevaConvention.