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Download the file - United Nations Rule of Law

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Policy responses to disaster risk207Unconsolidated informal settlements vary in <strong>the</strong>strength and character <strong>of</strong> leadership. Partnerships with localplanning authorities can build procedural rigour and provideadditional legitimacy. Such partnerships can also be a mechanismfor local planning authorities to initiate regularization,which <strong>of</strong>ten requires significant land-use decisions to bemade that can allow later provision <strong>of</strong> critical infrastructure,such as water and electricity.BUILDING CODES,REGULATION ANDDISASTER-RESISTANTCONSTRUCTIONIn 2003, an earthquake in <strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Bingol (Turkey)destroyed 300 buildings and damaged more than 5000o<strong>the</strong>rs. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> buildings that collapsed was a schooldormitory, killing 84 children. The dormitory had only beenbuilt in 1998 and was a modern engineered structure. Thefact that this event occurred only four years after <strong>the</strong>Marmara earthquake reopened <strong>the</strong> public debate on <strong>the</strong>prevailing standards and building codes that are applied or(as in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dormitory) not applied. 48Most countries have building codes aimed at ensuringthat construction meets a minimum standard <strong>of</strong> disasterresilience. In some cases, codes might not be as appropriateas <strong>the</strong>y could be. For example, in Jamaica, losses toHurricane Gilbert in 1988 included 30,235 homes. Highlosses have been blamed on a lack <strong>of</strong> preparedness in <strong>the</strong>physical planning and housing sectors and because <strong>the</strong> 1983National Building Code <strong>of</strong> Jamaica was inappropriatelymodelled on UK standards. In contrast to <strong>the</strong> housing sector,many small businesses were well prepared and were able toreturn to work quickly. 49The <strong>United</strong> <strong>Nations</strong> International Strategy forDisaster Reduction (ISDR) 50 recommends that buildingcodes should be:• realistic, given economic, environmental and technologicalconstraints;• relevant to current building practice and technology;• updated regularly in light <strong>of</strong> developments inknowledge;• understood fully and accepted by pr<strong>of</strong>essional interestgroups;• enforced in order to avoid <strong>the</strong> legislative system beingignored or falling into disrepute;• adhered to, with laws and controls based more on asystem <strong>of</strong> incentives ra<strong>the</strong>r than punishment;• integrated fully within a legal system that takes account<strong>of</strong> potential conflicts between <strong>the</strong> different levels <strong>of</strong>administration and government.Box 8.11 Relocation planning in Sacadura Cabral, São Paulo, BrazilIn 1997, relocation was proposed as part <strong>of</strong> a slum upgrading programme in Sacadura Cabral,São Paulo (Brazil). A densely populated barrio subject to annual flooding was chosen by cityplanners for relocation. A total <strong>of</strong> 200 families were to be relocated from within <strong>the</strong>settlements to allow redevelopment and upgrading <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> site.The selection <strong>of</strong> families to be moved was initially controlled by <strong>the</strong> planning authority;but this met with much local resistance and was eventually replaced by a more communicativestrategy built around a series <strong>of</strong> public meetings with communities and <strong>the</strong>ir leaders. Relocationplanning was revised as an outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se meetings. The new plan included a role for <strong>the</strong>local community in <strong>the</strong> selection <strong>of</strong> families to be relocated. An agreement was reached thatfamilies would be housed within 1 kilometre from Sacadura Cabral and be given access to subsidizedcredit. Local people were to lead <strong>the</strong> reconstruction and upgrading process, with technicalassistance from <strong>the</strong> local authorities.A particularly innovative aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> project that arose from local consultations wasthat <strong>the</strong> selection <strong>of</strong> families for relocation was not restricted to those living in areas withinSacadura Cabral to be upgraded. Instead, <strong>the</strong> whole community was included. Thus, some <strong>of</strong>those who agreed to be relocated were not living in areas to be cleared and upgraded. Therelocation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se families provided space within <strong>the</strong> existing community for some peopleliving in areas to be upgraded to be re-housed within <strong>the</strong> community.Source: Olivira and Denaldi, 1999The greatest challenge is enforcing adherence to buildingcodes during construction. Failure to comply with codes is aroot cause <strong>of</strong> vulnerability in buildings. Too <strong>of</strong>ten, perverseincentives make it more attractive for administrators, architects,builders, contractors and even house owners tocircumvent construction standards. This is not simply aproduct <strong>of</strong> poverty, but, at heart, is a problem <strong>of</strong> governance.In Turkey, much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> life associated with <strong>the</strong>Marmara earthquake in 1999 has been attributed to <strong>the</strong>ineffective regulation <strong>of</strong> construction. In this case, riskgenerated by ineffective governance was compounded byhigh inflation, which meant that few people had insurancecover. Public outrage at this failing led to a protest andreform <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> building regulation in Turkey.The potential for regulation <strong>of</strong> building codes to beundertaken by <strong>the</strong> private sector has been explored in recentresearch. Although it is argued that it might be cost efficientfor a private body to undertake site inspections, it is unclearif a private body would be any less open to <strong>the</strong> perverseincentives that distort public-sector inspection and enforcement.51 Even where external financing might be thought toprovide additional incentives for oversight and successfuluse <strong>of</strong> standards, this is not always <strong>the</strong> case. A recent review<strong>of</strong> World Bank lending during <strong>the</strong> period <strong>of</strong> 1984 to 2005found that 60 per cent <strong>of</strong> projects receiving disaster financingwere damaged by a subsequent event. Of 197 completedprojects with a focus on mitigation – designed to usedisaster-resistant standards – 26 per cent showed flaws indesign, and half had been damaged by a subsequent event.Of <strong>the</strong> 65 projects in <strong>the</strong> transportation, urban and waterand sanitation sectors approved between 2000 and 2004 incountries identified by <strong>the</strong> World Bank as disaster hotspots,only 3 projects included any detailed disaster planning. 52In cities <strong>of</strong> lower-income countries, but increasinglyalso in large cities <strong>of</strong> middle-income countries, <strong>the</strong> highproportion <strong>of</strong> citizens forced to reside in informal settlementswhere activities operate outside <strong>the</strong> formal planningand regulatory systems is particularly challenging for build-Failure to complywith codes isa root cause <strong>of</strong>vulnerability inbuildings

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