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308Summary of case studiestions with key stakeholders and solutions must be determinedwith inputs from the relevant stakeholders.• Engage the community in all levels of planning anddevelopment to ensure the successful implementationof policing strategies and social interventionprogrammes/initiatives. Communities must buy into theprocess and be recognized as partners in maintainingtheir own security.• Invest in human capital. The outcomes of many socialinterventions programmes indicate that investing in theindividual bears greater results than investing in structures.Evaluating investment in people might bedifficult; however, it serves to reinforce the work ofsocial intervention programmes in countries that faceeconomic and social challenges such as Jamaica.Crime and violence trends in Nairobi, KenyaOver the last two decades, violent crimes such as armedrobbery, murder, mugging, car jacking, housebreaking,physical and sexual assault and other forms of violent crimehave been on the increase in Nairobi. Other forms ofoffences include commercial and property crimes such asburglaries. Firearms trafficking – a consequence of civil warsin neighbouring countries – is a major contributor to crimeand violence in Nairobi.Criminal youth gangs are increasingly becoming agrowing phenomenon in Nairobi. The largest proportion ofcrime in Kenya is committed by youths, and over 50 per centof convicted prisoners in the country are aged between 16and 25 years. This makes it imperative to address youth crimeas a special focus of crime prevention strategy. Two groupshave been identified for illustrative purposes in this respect.These are the Mungiki movement and youth who live andwork on the streets (see Box 3.5). While these groups are notnecessarily criminal in all their interactions with the broadersociety, their association with crime, both real and perceived,is such that they warrant special attention.The Mungiki movement, with membership said torange between 200,000 and 2 million, is one of the mostsignificant youth groups in Kenya in terms of its propensityfor extreme violence and the potential for developing into ahighly disruptive force in society. The group came into thelimelight during the late 1990s, when media reportshighlighted groups of youths donning dreadlocks, takingunusual oaths and engaging in traditional prayers thatinvolved the sniffing of snuff. Mungiki then posed as a traditionalreligious group interested in reintroducing andpromoting the traditional way of life among the Kikuyupeople. The group unmistakably drew its inspiration fromthe Mau-Mau movement of Kenya’s struggle for independencefrom Britain during the 1950s. With time, it hastransformed itself into probably the most organized andfeared criminal group, with deep anti-establishment characteristics.In order to put the violence unleashed by themovement in proper perspective, a few examples areprovided:• In March 2002, Mungiki was implicated in the massacreof 23 people in Kariobangi (Nairobi) and were alsoinvolved in stripping women wearing mini-skirts andtrousers naked.• In January 2003, the movement was linked to the deathof 23 people in the outskirts of Nakuru.• Thereafter, in April 2003, over 50 armed Mungikimembers allegedly attacked a matatu (minibuses) crewin Kayole estate in Nairobi and killed five people in thesame area.• In November 2006, there was a resurgence of Mungikiviolence in the Mathare slums of Nairobi. This resultedin several deaths and scores of injuries, thedisplacement of many people, the wanton destructionof property and the disruption of livelihoods.The violent confrontations of November 2006 were a goodpointer to Mungiki’s transformation into an organized crimegroup with considerably deep roots in its areas of operation.The feeling that the movement is, in part, motivatedby economic gain is rife. While accurate information of theeconomic activities of the movement are not available, owingto its covert nature, several indicators point to themovement being engaged in lucrative ‘business’ activities.Among these activities are the forceful management ofmatatu stages, levying illegal taxes and extorting protectionmoney from large sections of Nairobi’s informal settlements.Working in a tight, disciplined manner, Mungiki has takenover the provision of security, water and electricity in variousslums in Nairobi. By ‘taxing’ residents of informal settlements,‘providing security’, presiding over kangaroo courtsand meting out their own form of justice, Mungiki has, ineffect, been functioning as a parallel government at the locallevel.In addition to the Mungiki movement, the growingpopulation living and working in the streets of Nairobi andother Kenyan urban areas is a matter of major security andgeneral development concern for the affected areas (see Box3.2). Over the years, the number of street children has beenon the rise. There were approximately 115 street children in1975. By 1990, this had grown to 17,000. In 2001, thenumber of street children countrywide was estimated to be250,000. With older street dwellers included, the totalnumber increases to 300,000. The bulk of such streetdwellers are found in Nairobi, which, at present, has aconservative estimate of 60,000 street people.The issue of street families as an important factor inthe city’s security is both real and perceived. It is real in thatstreet families are involved in criminal activities, whichinclude drug peddling and prostitution, as well as theft ofmobile phones, vehicle lights and side mirrors, and othervaluables from pedestrians and motorists. Older streetpersons are also known to be involved in more serious crime,such as muggings and rape. Consequently, the public generallyperceives street persons as criminals, thieves, drugaddicts and eyesores who should be removed from thestreets.In an effort to address the challenge posed by streetpeople and the pressure from city residents for the govern-