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140Security of tenureIt would be foolishto pass from onedistortion – that theslums are places ofcrime, disease anddespair – to theopposite that theycan be safely left tolook afterthemselvesLegalization throughamnesties …provide varyingdegrees of politicalsecurity of tenure,rather than legalsecurity of tenurechannels government funds, in the form of infrastructuresubsidies and soft housing loans, directly to poor communities.These communities are then responsible for theplanning and carrying out of improvements to their housing,environment and basic services and manage the budgetthemselves. 8As argued in Chapter 5, while the question of securityof tenure and access to the registration system can becomplex and cumbersome for poor communities, in-situupgrading of settlements has been widely used as an entrypoint for improving living conditions. The practical negotiations,dialogues and interfaces undertaken betweenauthorities and communities in a number of such settlementsupgrading initiatives have in fact contributed toexploring and establishing more acceptable and viable tenuresystems at the country level (see Box 6.4).Limits of community-based upgrading andregularizationIn the decades to come, programmes similar to thosedescribed above may or may not prove to have been thewisest policy route. But whether it succeeds or fails, thisapproach arose due to the historical and (perhaps even)structural inabilities of either the state or the market toprovide safe, secure, affordable and accessible housing toeveryone within a given society. Again, as if by default,governments now turn to the people themselves as the onlysources of energy and resources that can hope to transformthe informal city into an increasingly desirable place inwhich to live and work. To a degree, such an approach hasmuch to offer: it can empower people and communities todetermine their own fate; it can ensure that people areactive participants within an increasingly democratic urbandevelopment process; and it can ‘enable’ them to buildhousing and communities that best suit their needs andwishes.And yet, it can also be simply that neither the statenor the private sector are sufficiently interested in undertakinglegal reforms and making the infrastructure and otherinvestments needed to actually transform poor communities.Thus, the poor have no other option than organizing andpooling their common resources and resolving to improvethe places where they reside. It would, however, be unwiseto disregard the reservations raised to increasing emphasison sweat equity: ‘It would be foolish to pass from one distortion– that the slums are places of crime, disease and despair– to the opposite that they can be safely left to look afterthemselves.’ 9 It is widely recognized that the withdrawal ofthe state from many of the public provision sectors, coupledwith the privatization of previously public goods, has had amajor impact on increases in poverty and inequality duringthe 1980s and 1990s. The growing weakness (or unwillingness)of central and local governments in many countriesmeans that good governance with respect to securinghousing, land and property rights for all, including security oftenure, is increasingly absent. When this is combined with alack of democratic decision-making and democratic participation,as well as inappropriate regulatory frameworks that areincreasingly anti-poor in orientation, the result is the citieswe see today in most developing countries (i.e. in whichgrowing numbers of people are forced into informalitysimply because they have no other option). In such contexts,upgrading and regularization will be of limited assistance.Within a truly democratic city, existing in a trulydemocratic nation, where the rule of law and human rightsflourish and are taken as seriously as they are intended to be,the importance of community-based action is, of course,beyond question. However, there is a danger in relying tooheavily on the poor to help themselves without a correspondingincrease in commitment by governments and theinternational community to develop legal and regulatoryframeworks that are appropriate, that are consistent with thescale of the problem and which actually succeed in providingsecurity of tenure for everyone, everywhere. This will onlyresult in current trends of slum growth continuing into thefuture. Involving the community in the security of tenureprocess is one thing; but supporting policies that place anover-reliance on the community, however, is another issueentirely.TITLING ANDLEGALIZATIONDuring the last few years there has been an increasing focuson titling to achieve the goal of security of tenure for all. Theprimary argument has been that the provision of propertytitles to the world’s slum dwellers and those living ‘illegally’will not only give them rights to land and property, butbecause of the ability to use land as collateral, will also facilitatetheir access to credit. 10 Issuing of freehold titles is,however, not the only way to achieve security of tenure ininformal settlements. Many countries have years of experiencewith simpler and less expensive responses.Countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Brazil, in particular,have seen years of official tolerance of illegal settlementsfollowed by periodic legalization through amnesties (see Box6.5). Such approaches are often quite pragmatic responsesto political problems. Moreover, they provide varyingdegrees of political security of tenure, rather than legalsecurity of tenure. In practice, however, the perceptionwithin the communities concerned may well be that theirlevel of security of tenure is quite high (see Box III.1).However, without simultaneous regularization measuresbeing undertaken, such legalization does not generally resultin greater access to services and infrastructure, nor does itsimplify the registration of housing, land and propertyrights. 11 Land titling with the provision of freehold title isclosely linked to the commonly recognized process ofadverse possession (see Box 6.6). This is a mechanism forawarding secure land tenure in a way that is associated withminimal institutional requirements. The requirement that abeneficiary has to have had possession and use of the landfor a specified period of time has several positive consequences.It eliminates the risk of past owners suddenlysurfacing and claiming the land, while at the same time