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Summary of case studies321nation, supply-driven irrelevant or redundant activities andinputs, competitive ‘bidding’ for client victims, and poorunderstanding of community needs. In many cases, localpopulations were never consulted on what and how theywanted the resources spent, as a result of which misunderstandingson needs and strategies to meet them ensued.Fortunately, international and national bodies fromgovernments, the private sector and NGOs are responding tothese criticisms, including those resulting from failures incoordination. The development of international aid trackingsystems is one method that seeks to streamline and improveaccountability in international assistance. In Thailand, theThailand International Development Cooperation Agency,with support from the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), has implemented the DevelopmentAssistance Database. This government-owned clearinghousefor information on technical assistance projects in thecountry is designed to aid long-term recovery by keepingupdated information on technical assistance projects. Byimproving information availability and consolidation, theDevelopment Assistance Database provides the opportunityto identify unmet needs and redundancy, make informeddecisions about priorities and coordinate among actors atdifferent levels.The tsunami illustrated the profound vulnerabilitiesof human settlements around the Indian Ocean. The disasterwas not a catastrophic anomaly, but rather a loomingprospect linked to failures in resilience and, more specifically,weak human security, physical and institutionalpreparedness, and the interaction of these weaknesses. Asthe tsunami recovery process continues to unfold, effortsincreasingly aim to build back better and there are signs ofsuccess.Disaster response and adaptation in Kobe,JapanKobe, a city of roughly 1.5 million people, is located in theHanshin region of western Japan, which produces around 10per cent of the country’s total gross national product (GNP).At 5:46 am on 17 January 1995, an earthquake of magnitude7.2 occurred on the northern tip of Awaji Island, heavilydamaging structures as far away as 70 kilometres. Withinthis area was much of metropolitan Kobe.The disaster left 6300 dead, 150,000 buildingsdestroyed, 300,000 people homeless and caused directeconomic losses of US$200 billion, making it one of thecostliest earthquakes on record. The indirect economiclosses resulting from disrupted commerce and industry inKobe and its economic hinterland, which stretches intoSoutheast Asia, are thought to significantly exceed directlosses. Exacerbating the situation was the severity of damageto the city’s lifelines. Transportation, gas and water serviceswere disrupted, and Kobe’s power and communicationsystems were heavily damaged.While the earthquake itself was of a formidablemagnitude, the resulting catastrophe was a combination ofseveral risk factors. Geological conditions exacerbated lossgiven the soft, water-saturated soils of the city, which led tostructural damage and landslides from soil liquefaction. Kobeis also located on a narrow strip of land between the OsakaBay and the Rokko Mountains. The collapse of elevated roadsand railways severed all major transportation lines withinthis narrow corridor.The built environment of the city further aggravateddamage from the earthquake. Most lifelines and infrastructurewere built prior to the implementation of more rigorouscodes and performed poorly during the earthquake. Housingin Kobe was particularly vulnerable to damage since anestimated 60 per cent consisted of traditional woodendwellings with heavy tiled roofs supported by light frames, adesign created with storms in mind but ill suited for earthquakes.Thus, housing constituted 95 per cent of thebuilding damage and accounted for more than 50 per cent ofthe total value of the damage in the Hanshin region, leavinghundreds of thousands of residents in need of temporaryshelter. Like many older cities, central areas had narrowstreets with very dense populations – around 6000 to12,000 people per square kilometre. Moreover, the City ofKobe’s development pattern had drawn investment, andpeople, away from inner areas, thus exacerbating the degreeof dilapidation and neglect.Socio-economic polarization, which had alreadybegun to manifest itself within the geography of the city wellbefore the earthquake, was an additional factor thatincreased vulnerability in Kobe. The destruction was concentratedin low-income areas of the inner city, where residentstended to be the elderly, working class citizens or studentsliving in low-cost houses. This is reflected in the death rates– 53 per cent of those killed were more than 60 years old,and rates for persons in their mid 20s were also comparativelyhigh. The inner-city areas also had communities ofimmigrant labourers and buraku, a ‘historically untouchablecaste’. Vulnerability within specific neighbourhoods andcommunities had been allowed to continue unaddressed bypolicy-makers, and arguably remained unaddressed throughoutthe recovery process. Middle-class families tended tolive outside the city centre, where newer higher-qualityhousing existed.In the period after the earthquake, the government ofJapan constructed 48,000 temporary housing units to house100,000 people. Within the heavily damaged centre, cityparks and schools were used for temporary shelters.However, the majority of shelters were placed in the outerareas of the city on vacant land or parking lots, two hoursaway by bus or train. Preference was given to the elderly anddisabled, who accounted for 60 per cent of the population inthe camps, as well as to single parents. Despite good intentions,moving the elderly and disabled to temporary housingin the outlying areas of the city separated an especiallyvulnerable population from their families and services.Temporary shelters officially closed after eight months,although housing needs were still unmet for thousands ofdisplaced persons. As a result, many resorted to makeshiftshelters in tents or under tarps, or relocated altogether toother cities. Many could not rely on insurance payments torebuild their homes due to restricted policies (see also Box12.15).