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182Natural and human-made disastersTable 7.8Natural disasters andsocio-political changeSource: Pelling, 2003; except *:Dill and Pelling, 2006City (country) Date of disaster Disaster trigger Socio-political reactionLice (Turkey) 1972 Earthquake Discrimination against the minority Kurdish population was blamed for inadequate preparedness before,and relief aid after, the earthquake. Complaints were made by a Kurdish member of parliament to theTurkish Parliament.Managua (Nicaragua) 1972 Earthquake The scale of corruption by the Somoza dictatorship united workers, intellectuals, the business communityand international popular opinion fuelling a popular revolution that eventually led to a change in regime.Guatemala City (Guatemala) 1976 Earthquake Described as a ‘classquake’ because of its high impact among slum dwellers, this event stimulatedpopular mobilization and land invasions, which reshaped the geography of the city.(Chile, nationwide) 1985 Earthquake A traditional civilian response threatened to undermine a weak dictatorship. The response wasdemobilized through repression and the state took over.Mexico City (Mexico) 1985 Earthquake Inadequate state response. A highly organized civil society-led reconstruction programme emerged,unique in Mexico’s modern history of authoritarian state control.Miami (US) 1992 Hurricane Broad interest coalitions formed, assisting in the rebuilding of the city. These coalitions have not persistedbut have created the potential for cooperation in local politics.Marmara * (Turkey) 1999 Earthquake A conspicuous failure in state oversight of the construction industry led to riots and political lobbying forpolicy change.…political relationsat the local level willbe tested by disasterevents …space. It may be possible to assess how disaster risk reduction,the hazard events themselves and their aftermath openor close political space. In other words, do the activitiesconducted during these periods of disaster managementprovide an opportunity for inclusive governance? Disasterscan act as catalysts highlighting underlying inequality, corruptionand incompetence that fuels popular unrest; but theycan also close political space. More authoritarian politicalregimes whose legitimacy is built on the control of politicalpower in a national state are likely to feel threatened by anyopening of political space through disaster, and so may beexpected to act to restrain emerging civil society voices.Entrenched political systems are difficult to change and singledisaster events rarely achieve significant political movement,unless this was already entrained before the event.Table 7.8 presents information from studies of disastersthat have had a mainly urban impact and were triggeredby a natural hazard. In many cases, it was the capital city thatwas hit, with political consequences for the nation as awhole. In cases where the formal state response has beenpolitically biased (Turkey in 1972) or inadequate (MexicoCity in 1985; Turkey in 1999), civil society responses haveemerged or even come to dominate disaster relief, recovery(Chile in 1985; Mexico City in 1985) and reconstruction(Guatemala City in 1976). In many cases, civil society effortscan become formalized when interest groups have createdcoalitions with the state (Miami in 1992; Mexico City in1985; Turkey in 1999) or protested through formal politicalor legislative channels (Turkey in 1972). Where politicaldifferences between the cooperating groups are too large,collaboration may not last long beyond the disaster reconstructionperiod (Miami in 1992); but even here theexperience is likely to have built up new trust between civilsociety groups within the city.State elites can benefit from disaster when, forexample, the political function of party networks is adaptedfor relief distribution or institutional weaknesses allowcorruption (Managua in 1972), thus strengthening ‘clientalism’in society. This suggests that it can be in the interest ofparasitic governing elites to allow degeneration in the institutionsoverseeing disaster response (providing a space forcorruption), while investing in state control over local disasterresponse strategies (to prevent the emergence ofpotentially critical civil society organizations). Where statesdo not benefit from disaster, astute politicians can controlpotential damage. In 1966, despite having made decisionsthat directly led to increased vulnerability to flooding in NewOrleans, the incumbent mayor was successfully re-elected,having demonstrated leadership in reconstruction. 47Beyond the national level, political relations at thelocal level will be tested by disaster events and also by riskreduction and reconstruction interventions. If disaster riskreduction is to be effective in changing the root causes ofrisk, then change in local social and political relations –between gender, economic class, cast, and ethnic andreligious groups – is a legitimate target for action. Even wherechange is not intended, this may often be an unplannedoutcome of interventions, with positive and negative consequencesfor those affected. For all disaster types at the locallevel, periods of disaster and emergency response – especiallyif these are prolonged – can result in dislocations in theauthority of the state and the emergence of, if only temporarily,alternative forms of social organization. Disasters can alsolead to more positive social bonding and the building of trustbetween people forced together by adversity.Cultural impacts of disasterUrban areas concentrate cultural assets, including architecturallysignificant buildings and urban landscapes, but alsoartworks housed in urban centres. The Jahrhundertflut floodof August 2002 that affected the Czech Republic, Germanyand Hungary, is one recent example where cultural assetswere at risk. The World Heritage towns of Cesky Krumlov andPrague were damaged and large galleries in Dresden andPrague were flooded. In Prague, flooding in the NationalMuseum and Prague University of Technology caused damageto books, including an archive on Czech architecture. Thevulnerability of the historic city of Genoa (Italy) further illustratesthe cultural impacts of disasters (see Box 7.7).The United Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Listincludes 644 cultural and 24 mixed cultural and naturalproperties (including an additional 162 natural properties,such as nature parks). Many of these sites are located inearthquake-risk hotspots in Central America and Central Asia