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21-10 Industrial Communication Systems<br />

Safety-related part of node (gray)<br />

Node<br />

A<br />

B<br />

Black channel<br />

Non-safety-related part of node<br />

(black)<br />

FIGURE 21.5<br />

Black-channel concept.<br />

21.5.2 Hazard and Risk Analysis<br />

Hazard and risk analysis is a crucial step in every safety lifecycle and safety development of a <strong>communication</strong><br />

system (see, e.g., VDI2184 [VDI2184]). Hazards increase the risk of a fatality and not only must be<br />

identified by a hazard and risk analysis but also mitigated by implementing safety measures according<br />

to safety requirements. As outlined before, there is a magnitude of possibilities (e.g., HAZOP or FMEA)<br />

of how to carry out a hazard analysis.<br />

The scope of the hazard and risk analysis is the node connected to the <strong>communication</strong> system. First,<br />

hazards resulting from failures on the network, which are influencing node safety, must be investigated.<br />

It is not intended to ensure network safety in case of a black-channel approach and hence not included<br />

into safety considerations. Second, the node hardware and firmware itself has to be examined regarding<br />

failures. Moreover, the risk caused by the failures must be assessed and safety measures according to the<br />

target SIL have to be specified.<br />

Table 21.5 lists typical network faults. The faults can be categorized in three different groups: faults<br />

directly corresponding to human mistakes (8, 9), faults not directly relating to human mistakes (1–7),<br />

and faults either directly or indirectly referring to human mistakes (10). The cause of such a grouping is<br />

to point out that human mistakes must be considered during investigation of (network) faults.<br />

The next step is to identify the network failures resulting from faults listed in Table 21.5. Network failures<br />

can be separated into stochastic (i.e., hardware failures) and systematic failures. Another important<br />

topic is to analyze the effect of the failure (i.e., the hazard). Therefore, an FMEA is an appropriate means<br />

as shown in Table 21.6.<br />

Risk analysis can be performed by quantifying or qualifying the risk. According to IEC61508, stochastic<br />

or hardware failures can be quantified, others only qualified by specifying discrete levels such as “low,”<br />

“medium,” or “high.” For example, risk of a “bits being destroyed” can be calculated by the following.<br />

TABLE 21.5<br />

Typical Network Faults<br />

1. Crosstalk 6. Aging<br />

2. Broken cable 7. Temperature<br />

3. EMC failure 8. Human failure<br />

4. Stochastic failure 9. Wiring failure by human<br />

5. Stuck at failure 10. Transmission of non-authorized messages<br />

Source: Reinert, D. and Schaefer, M. (Publisher), Sichere Bussysteme<br />

in der Automation, Hüthig Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany, 2001, 32 pp.<br />

With permission.<br />

© <strong>2011</strong> by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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