wilamowski-b-m-irwin-j-d-industrial-communication-systems-2011

Protocols in Power Generation 29-3
over the whole installation. These systems are connected to the plant control room through intra-plant
communication infrastructure. In the following paragraphs, examples of intra-plant communication in
nuclear power generation automation systems are presented because they have numerous and specific
requirements comparing to other power generation technologies.
29.2.1 Example of Nuclear Power Plant Automation Systems
In a nuclear power plant, there are, as in fossil fuel power plant, several automation systems (Figure 29.3):
turbine control, boiler control, core protection control, switchyard control, and other dedicated control
systems (chemical processing, air conditioning, etc.).
The difference with fossil fuel power plants is the mandatory high safety level. For example, the core
protection control system must be designed for this purpose following very strong design rules, whereas
the safety requirements on the boiler control system authorized the use of commercial off-the-shelf control
system if it fulfills the requirements on its class of systems. The other control systems (turbine and
switchyard) are often provided by the corresponding system manufacturers and they are not concerned
by nuclear-specific safety requirements.
The global automation systems, which are designed to interact with the operators in the control room,
are particularly concerned by the safety design rules. These systems involve control functions from level
0 to level 2 as shown in Figure 29.2. In the following paragraph, the nuclear safety design rules of automation
system will be detailed.
29.2.2 Safety Requirements and System Classifications
(IEC 61226, F1A, F1B, F2)
Safety requirements in nuclear power generation concern many systems. There are strong design rules
on the automation systems and particularly on the communication subsystems that are included in
the core protection control systems. The required characteristics of the communication subsystems are
determinism, redundancy, functional and technical diversity, and fault tolerance. Moreover, the functional
architecture of the global control systems must comply with the system classification rules that
TXS
SPPA T2000
Conventional
technology
Specific technology
Backup
operation
system
Main
operation
system
Standard I&C
Technical premises of crisis
Synoptic view
Backup panel
Level 2
RCSL
reactor
control
Core I&C
PS
reactor
protection
SAS (safety
automation
system)
PACS
Main automation systems
Standard I&C
PAS (process
automation
system)
PACS
TPCS
Turbine I&C
Turbine & generator I&C
Level 1
Grappes de
contröle
Actuators
F1A
Actuators
F1A
Actuator
F1B
Sensors
F1B
Actuator F2
et NC
Sensors F2
et NC
Level 0
FIGURE 29.3
Example of core protection control system.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC