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6LoWPAN: IP for Wireless Sensor Networks and Smart Cooperating Objects 51-13<br />

active RFC4944 of the 6LoWPAN working group. It should be mentioned here that active discussions<br />

in the time of writing this chapter of 6LoWPAN working group are heading to an update of RFC4944.<br />

Hence, the values might differ if the RFC is updated but might provide an overview about approximate<br />

header sizes. The third column in the table shows the remaining space for the payload or further protocol<br />

headers. The combination of MESH, FRAG, and IP headers with the listed TCP, UDP, and ICMP<br />

headers is omitted for clarity.<br />

51.5.8 Security<br />

Specific application domains and scenarios require secure data transmission and data integrity. For<br />

example, for health care applications, recorded vital parameters of patients sent via 6LoWPAN over<br />

IEEE 802.15.4 should be exchanged with trusted endpoints only. The 6LoWPAN working group analyzed<br />

different possibilities to meet the necessary security constraints.<br />

The first security issue that has to be considered is the secure data transmission itself. IEEE 802.15.4<br />

provides AES encryption security on the link layers for secure point-to-point <strong>communication</strong>. System<br />

engineers should always keep in mind that it is not specified in IEEE 802.15.4, how the key for the<br />

encryption is deployed. The 6LoWPAN working group proposes to use the built-in AES security for<br />

<strong>communication</strong> of RFDs in terms of IEEE 802.15.4.<br />

6LoWPAN does not exclude the usage of existing security mechanisms and protocols like IPsec and<br />

TLS, which allow end-to-end security. Because of the estimated higher energy consumption due to the<br />

security on IP layer or above, these security mechanisms are proposed to be used by FFDs only. FFDs<br />

are expected to have lower constraints concerning energy consumption. Protocols like IPsec and TLS<br />

permit interoperability with external IP-based networks also (cf. Figure 51.9).<br />

The second security issue bases on the method how IPv6-compliant addresses are derived from the<br />

802.15.4 built-in EUI-64 bit device identifier. Hence, this identifier should be unique for every 802.15.4<br />

device, the generated IP addresses are unique as well and might be traced by attackers. There is no protection<br />

that the generated IPv6 address is not globally unique. In specific scenarios, persons do not want<br />

to be identified through their surrounding wireless body area network based on 6LoWPAN devices.<br />

Thus, the 6LoWPAN specifications do not forbid the usage of customizable device identifiers for IPv6<br />

address generating.<br />

External IP core<br />

6LoWPAN FFD<br />

network node edge router<br />

FFD 6LoWPAN node RFD 6LoWPAN node<br />

Application<br />

Application<br />

Application<br />

Application<br />

TCP/UDP<br />

TCP/UDP<br />

TCP/UDP<br />

TCP/UDP<br />

IPv6<br />

6LoWPAN/IPv6<br />

6LoWPAN<br />

6LoWPAN<br />

802.X MAC 802.X + 802.15.4 MAC<br />

802.15.4 MAC<br />

802.15.4 MAC<br />

802.X PHY 802.x + 802.15.4 PHY 802.15.4 PHY 802.15.4 PHY<br />

Point-to-point via 802.15.4 AES End-to-end via IPSec End-to-end via TLS<br />

FIGURE 51.9<br />

Security protocols.<br />

© <strong>2011</strong> by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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