wilamowski-b-m-irwin-j-d-industrial-communication-systems-2011

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Security in Industrial Communication Systems 22-11 • Trojan horse: A Trojan horse obscures its malicious intent by pretending to have a useful function. However, after being activated by the user, a hidden malicious function is performed that allows a remote adversary to gain unauthorized access to the host that executes the Trojan horse. • Logical bomb: A logical bomb is malware that only activates itself after certain conditions are met. A special kind of logical bomb is a time bomb where a specific point in time is used as trigger. • Rootkit: A rootkit is a special kind of malware that infects the system in a way that it remains invisible at the host. To achieve this, rootkits typically replace core components of the system software like kernel modules in operating systems. • Backdoor or trapdoor: This kind of malware provides an alternative way to access the infected system that bypasses the normal authentication procedure. • Spyware: Spyware usually does not cause direct harm. It rather collects confidential information on the host being used for further attacks, e.g., passwords or other major assets (e.g., chemical recipes). Like any other security attack, malware is only able to utilize existing vulnerabilities in the device to infect it. To counteract attacks on software two possibilities exit: First, methods can be used that prevent the existence of vulnerabilities. Second, if a full prevention is not possible, malware or the attempt to insert it into the device’s software shall at least be detected. Countermeasures that prevent and/or detect the existence of malware can be categorized as follows. • Static software methods try to avoid the existence of software vulnerabilities a priori during the software development. Typical techniques are static code analysis methods that try to detect programming flaws (e.g., buffer overflows) as well as code-signing methods where the developer signs the executables to confirm the non-modification. Another example is proof-carrying code where the developer provides a proof along with a program that allows checking with certainty that the code can be executed in a secure way. • Dynamic software methods try to identify malware by detecting a malicious behavior during runtime. A common approach is to use a host-based IDS that detects malicious behavior or actions during runtime (cf. Section 22.3.4). A similar technique is called software monitoring, where program execution is observed to check whether the software behaves according to a specified security policy. Another approach is to use self-checking code. Here, the software itself verifies the program code for unauthorized modifications during execution. A further approach that is popular in environments where untrustworthy and thus possible malicious software has to be executed is called sandboxing. Using this technique, the untrustworthy software is running in a so-called sandbox where it is executed in a controlled way with restricted permissions. The main advantage of this scheme is that malicious software is not able to leave the sandbox and infect other parts of the system since an interaction with the rest of the system is only possible using well-defined and protected interfaces. • Hardware supported methods use hardware-specific implementations that try to avoid an insertion of malware. A typical example is the use of microcontrollers that are implementing the Harvard architecture. Due to the physical partitioning of instruction and data memory, code injection is not possible by design. Another recent technique is the no execute (NX) bit in modern CPUs, where memory regions can be designated as being non-executable. Another common approach is the use of a coprocessor that is dedicated to perform security checks during runtime. • Human-assisted methods: In cases where automatic methods cannot fully prevent or detect the existence of malware, human-assisted methods can additionally be used. Typical examples are manual inspection or the use of certificated software. Obviously, human-assisted methods are time consuming and require extensive knowledge. Therefore, it is reasonable to use them only in combination with automatic techniques. © 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
22-12 Industrial Communication Systems Guaranteeing a secure environment for the execution of software is a typical task of the operation system running on the device. However, industrial communication systems contain embedded devices with limited system resources. Therefore, these devices are often not equipped with an operation system that provides support for advanced security services. Therefore, providing a secure software execution environment is especially challenging in embedded networks. 22.5 State of the Art in Automation Systems This section will give an overview of the state of the art of security measures in industrial communication systems. These are divided into fieldbus systems originally designed for building automation, but also used in industrial communications, classical industrial fieldbus systems, and IP-based networks. An overview of the supported security mechanisms can be found in Table 22.1 at the end of this section. 22.5.1 Security in Building Automation Systems Today, many different protocol standards for building automation systems exist. The most important open ones that span more than one application domain are BACnet [BAC], KNX [KNX], LonWorks [LON], and IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee [IEE,ZIG]. BACnet in its current version—version number 2008—offers an authentication service as well as different security services that guarantee data confidentiality, data integrity, and data freshness. These mechanisms use the symmetric Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm and a trusted key server, which is responsible for generating and distributing the secret keys. However, due to several security flaws [GR2], there are investigations underway to replace these security services by new ones. The new security architecture, which is defined in BACnet Addendum g, uses AES and HMAC in combination with a message ID and a time stamp. At the time of writing, BACnet Addendum g has not been declared as final yet. KNX, on the other hand, only provides a basic access control scheme based on clear-text passwords. Up to 255 different access levels can be defined, each of them associated with a different (otherwise unspecified) set of privileges. For each of these access levels, a 4 byte password (key) can be specified. However, since this rudimentary access control mechanism does not provide strong security [GR2], it is only of limited use in security-critical environments. Furthermore, it is not available for process data exchange, which is called group communication in KNX. In LonWorks, an authentication mechanism that guarantees data integrity and freshness is available. Support for data confidentiality is not provided. This mechanism is based on a four-step challenge– response protocol. The used cryptographic algorithm calculates a 64 bit hash value over the plain TABLE 22.1 Security Services of Common Fieldbus Systems Fieldbus Foundation Fieldbus ControlNet PROFIBUS P-Net WorldFIP Interbus SwiftNet LonWorks KNX BACnet Addendum g ZigBee Security Services 8 access groups, 8 bit unencrypted password Connection authentication, unencrypted password Access control for predefined addresses Simple write protection for variables 8 access groups, 8 bit unencrypted password 8 access groups, 8 bit unencrypted password None Challenge–response auth., integrity check, MD5 for IP Unencrypted password for management access AES for data confidentiality, HMAC for data integrity, time stamp + message ID for data freshness CCM* algorithm for data integrity, freshness, and confidentiality © 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
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The Industrial Electronics Handbook
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The Electrical Engineering Handbook
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CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group 60
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viii Contents 11 Industrial Strengt
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x Contents 46 Profisafe............
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Preface The field of industrial ele
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xvi Preambles Thilo Sauter Institut
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xviii Preambles are the same. Commu
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xx Preambles In order to cater to h
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xxii Preambles In this manner, it i
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Editorial Board Dietmar Bruckner Vi
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xxviii Editors J. David Irwin recei
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Contributors Teresa Albero-Albero E
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Contributors xxxiii Georg Gaderer I
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Contributors xxxv Peter Neumann Ins
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Contributors xxxvii Thomas Tamandl
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I Technical Principles 1 ISO/OSI Mo
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Technical Principles I-3 18 Clock S
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1-2 Industrial Communication System
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2 Media Herbert Schweinzer Vienna U
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Media 2-3 TABLE 2.1 Overview over S
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Media 2-5 Single ended Differential
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Media 2-7 2.2.6 Standards Numerous
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4 Routing in Wireless Networks Tere
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6 Industrial Wireless Sensor Networ
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Industrial Wireless Sensor Networks
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16 Industrial Agent Technology Alek
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18 Clock Synchronization in Distrib
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Page 294 and 295: 20 Network-Based Control Josep M. F
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Page 302 and 303: 21 Functional Safety Thomas Novak S
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Page 366 and 367: 25 Process Automation Alois Zoitl V
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26 Building and Home Automation Wol
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27 Industrial Multimedia Javier Sil
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Industrial Multimedia 27-3 Multimed
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Industrial Multimedia 27-5 FIGURE 2
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Industrial Multimedia 27-7 which wo
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Industrial Multimedia 27-9 is neces
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Industrial Multimedia 27-13 [WIF01]
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28 Industrial Wireless Communicatio
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Industrial Wireless Communications
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29 Protocols in Power Generation Tu
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Protocols in Power Generation 29-3
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30 Communications in Medical Applic
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Communications in Medical Applicati
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III Technologies 31 Controller Area
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Technologies III-3 53 WirelessHART,
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31 Controller Area Network Joaquim
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Controller Area Network 31-7 I/O Ap
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32 Profibus Max Felser Bern Univers
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Profibus 32-3 TABLE 32.3 Transmissi
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Profibus 32-5 32.3 Fieldbus Data Li
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Profibus 32-7 in Figure 32.3. He si
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Profibus 32-13 [IEC84-3] IEC 61784-
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33 INTERBUS Juergen Jasperneite Ost
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INTERBUS 33-3 One total frame Loopb
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INTERBUS 33-5 interface shutdown. T
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INTERBUS 33-7 include the entire da
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34 WorldFip Francisco Vasques Unive
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WorldFip 34-3 Data producer Data co
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WorldFip 34-5 TABLE 34.1 Variable N
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WorldFip 34-7 Write service Read se
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35 Foundation Fieldbus Carlos Eduar
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36 Modbus Mário de Sousa Universit
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Modbus 36-15 Modbus TCP frame MBAP
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37 Industrial Ethernet Gaëlle Mars
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Industrial Ethernet 37-3 37.2.2 Wha
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Industrial Ethernet 37-7 TABLE 37.1
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40 PROFINET Max Felser Bern Univers
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PROFINET 40-3 A plant unit contains
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45 LIN-Bus Andreas Grzemba Universi
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47 SafetyLon Thomas Novak SWARCO Fu
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SafetyLon 47-5 In detail, a hardwar
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SafetyLon 47-7 Signal output Safety
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48 Wireless Local Area Networks Hen
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50 ZigBee Stefan Mahlknecht Vienna
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ZigBee 50-3 Wireless communication
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ZigBee 50-5 Table 50.2 Physical Cha
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ZigBee 50-7 Coordinator Router End
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51 6LoWPAN: IP for Wireless Sensor
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6LoWPAN: IP for Wireless Sensor Net
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52 WiMAX in Industry Milos Manic Un
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WiMAX in Industry 52-3 However, the
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WiMAX in Industry 52-5 represents a
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WiMAX in Industry 52-7 Technical St
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53 WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, and OC
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WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, and OCARI
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TABLE 54.1 Characteristics of Some
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FIGURE 55.1 CPU IN-Log IN-Num OUT-l
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START FIGURE 55.3 COLD WARM STOP E_
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START RUNSTOP COLD INIT INITO WARM
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FIGURE 55.9 Different addresses of
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EtherNet FIGURE 55.11 Device: LED1
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60 User Datagram Protocol—UDP Ale
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User Datagram Protocol—UDP 60-3 8
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User Datagram Protocol—UDP 60-5 F
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User Datagram Protocol—UDP 60-7 F
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User Datagram Protocol—UDP 60-9 I
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61 Transmission Control Protocol—
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Transmission Control Protocol—TCP
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65 Semantic Web Services for Manufa
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Semantic Web Services for Manufactu
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V Outlook 67 Trends and Challenges
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68 Processing Data in Complex Commu
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